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Morality refers to ethics, to that which is considered to be right or wrong, to 
codes of conduct. These codes of conduct, or normative rules about how one 
is supposed to feel, think, and behave, are put forward by the social groups 
one belongs to. At the most abstract level, these are explicitly formulated by 
societies in terms of laws, and by religions in terms of, for example, the Ten 
Commandments. In everyday life, however, codes of conduct are set by the 
smaller social groups one belongs to, such as companies, schools, and clubs. 
Usually these codes of conduct are not explicitly formulated but rather 
manifest itself in implicit norms and expectations as to how one should, and 
should not, behave as a member of that group. Individuals are not only expected 
to behave in line with the group’s norms and expectations, they are also 
motivated to do so. That is, individuals derive part of their self-esteem from 
their group membership, and consequently strive towards attainment of a 
positive social identity (i.e., a positive evaluation of that part of their self that 
comprises their group membership; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). At the intragroup 
level this means that groups evaluate the extent to which individual group 
members adhere to the group’s norms and expectations, thereby affirming and 
maintaining the positive social identity of the group. In turn, individual group 
members care about how the group evaluates them and are motivated to act 
accordingly.  
Despite the great potential to influence others on the basis of morality 
judgments, the majority of previous studies examining what motivates group 
members have mainly focused on competence judgments as the primary 
domain of evaluation. Competence judgments are important because they 
reflect the group’s and individual group members’ level of success, which in 
turn determines both their individual and the group’s status. More recently, 
however, the attention of researchers who investigate group processes and 
intergroup relations has shifted towards the motivational power of judgments 
on the domain of morality (e.g., Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012; Leach, Bilali, 
& Pagliaro, 2013). As Albert Einstein implied, it might be more important for 
individuals to adhere to the group’s moral standards than to try to meet the 
group’s standards of competence.  
Indeed, moral motivation refers to the motivational force of morality 
judgments (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008). That is, morality 
judgments seem to have an intrinsic connection with motivation and behavior. 
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When something is judged to be (im)moral, for example as either being right 
or wrong, individuals tend to be intrinsically motivated to act accordingly (e.g., 
Aquino & Reed, 2002). Morality judgments thus have a motivational impact on 
individuals, because individuals are generally inclined to behave in ways that 
they judge to be “good”, “right”, and “fair”. This is not only the case for 
individuals’ own morality judgments, but also for the morality judgments of 
the group. Research has demonstrated how morality judgments at the 
individual level motivate behavioral choices (e.g., moral reasoning and decision 
making; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt & 
Kesebir, 2010), whereas research at the intergroup level has demonstrated how 
morality judgments affect intergroup relations (e.g., stereotyping, intergroup 
violence; Bandura, 1999; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Yet, little 
research has examined how morality judgments regulate behavior within 
groups. This is the focus of the research described in this dissertation.  
The aim of the current dissertation is to shed more light on the impact of 
moral motivation on individuals in groups by adopting a social identity 
approach. This approach can help us understand how individuals as members 
of social groups feel, think, and behave. Building on the premise that a social 
identity can motivate individual group members, in the research described in 
this dissertation I examine the impact of morality judgments on group 
members’ motivational responses—in terms of affect, cognition, 
psychophysiology, and behavior—and compare those to the impact of 
competence judgments. I investigate the regulation of group behavior by 
taking on an intragroup perspective: In Chapter 2, I focus on how group 
members respond to the group’s morality or competence judgments of their 
own prior behavior; in Chapter 3, I demonstrate how the morality or 
competence judgments of another ingroup member’s behavior reflect on the 
self as a group member; and in Chapter 4, I examine how group members 
respond to prospective group members who are judged on the domain of 
morality or competence. In sum, the goal of the current dissertation is to 
enhance our understanding of how morality vs. competence judgments 






A social identity approach to intragroup evaluations 
In examining the motivated behavior of individuals in groups, the social 
identity approach offers a comprehensive theoretical framework that provides 
an integrative perspective on group processes and intergroup relations. The 
social identity approach—consisting of Social Identity Theory and Self-
Categorization Theory—is indeed one of most influential approaches to 
understanding inter- and intragroup behavior. It has been extensively applied 
in research on the motivational, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of group 
processes, and explains, among other phenomena, individual motivation in 
groups in terms of the value of group membership for the self (e.g., Ellemers, 
2012; Hornsey, 2008; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Turner, 1991). 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), individuals 
derive part of their self-concept from their social identity. Social identity is that 
part of the self that stems from the social groups one belongs to and includes 
the emotional and evaluative consequences of this group membership. 
Considering that people are motivated to maintain positive self-esteem, they 
strive for a positive social identity (i.e., a positive evaluation of their group 
membership). Consequently, individuals care deeply about how the group 
evaluates them as well as other individuals in the group, because these others 
constitute part of their social identity. Following SIT’s propositions, Self-
Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987) elaborates on the cognitive aspects of social identification by explaining 
how individuals (self)categorize as members of social groups. This 
categorization leads to depersonalization, meaning that individuals, once 
categorized as members of a social group, see themselves more in terms of the 
attributes (e.g., emotions, attitudes, behavior) of the group than in terms of 
their relatively unique combination of personal attributes. In other words, 
individuals internalize the attributes of the group through a social identity 
(Postmes et al., 2005). According to the social identity approach, a social 
identity thus not only represents to which group an individual belongs, but also 
provides the individual with group norms as a useful guideline for the 
appropriate ways to feel, think, and act. Individuals are motivated to 
emphasize intragroup agreement about core group values (e.g., Brown, 2000; 
Hornsey, 2008). In turn, they strive to behave in ways that maintain the 
legitimacy of the group’s values and ultimately their positive social identity, 
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because this leads them to be liked and praised, and they gain ingroup respect 
from doing so (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Hogg & 
Hardie, 1991; Schmitt, Silvia, Branscombe, 2000).   
A primary strategy through which individuals can maintain the positive 
social identity of their group is by validating the group’s norms. Adherence to 
the prescriptive norms—the requirements that group members must meet in 
order to validate their positive social identity (e.g., Pinto, Marques, Levine, & 
Abrams, 2010)—are particular relevant for this purpose, because they lead to a 
set of expectations about how group members should feel, think, and act. The 
subjective group dynamics model describes how groups, through a process of 
intragroup differentiation, validate the group’s positive social identity (e.g., 
Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 
2001; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998). That is, groups 
differentiate between individual group members depending on the extent to 
which they adhere to the group’s standards, because validation of those 
standards legitimizes the group’s positive social identity (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, 
& Spears, 1995; Lee & Ottati, 1995).  
This differentiation in the extent to which group members adhere to the 
group’s norms can be established by means of a socialization process (Levine 
& Moreland, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982). During the socialization 
process, groups encourage individuals to adopt the group’s norms and evaluate 
whether they already fit these norms (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). This process is 
important for both the group and its individual members: The outcome 
determines whether individual group members are seen to meet the standards 
of the group, and, as a consequence, affects not only the social identity of the 
group as a whole, but also the identity of individual members in the group 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). When individual behavior is evaluated as being in 
line with the group’s expectations, the positive social identity of the individual 
and the group is validated and legitimized. However, when the evaluation 
reveals that there are discrepancies between the group’s expectations and the 
individual’s behavior, the positive social identity is at risk and the group 
undertakes action (e.g., excluding the individual) in order to protect its image.   
Indeed, deviating group members—group members who do not act in 
line with the group’s norms or expectations—undermine the positive social 
identity and as a consequence are often reprimanded. Rebukes can range from 
 
17 
a warning to derogation, hostility, punishment, and even social exclusion (e.g., 
Marques & Paez, 1994; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Pinto et al., 2010; Williams, 
Forgas, & Von Hippel, 2005). For example, the ‘Black Sheep Effect’ describes 
how deviating ingroup members are derogated and excluded from the group in 
order to uphold the positive social identity of the group (Marques, Yzerbyt, & 
Leyens, 1988). Although the majority of researchers examining responses to 
deviating group members have focused on negative deviants (i.e., group 
members who negatively deviate from the group’s standards; e.g., Marques et al., 
1988; Pinto et al., 2010), there is also research that demonstrates how group 
members who positively deviate from the group’s standards can arouse 
negativity (e.g., Abrams et al., 2000; Cleveland, Blascovich, Gangi, & Finez, 
2011; Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008; Parks & Stone, 2010).  
The key in understanding the negative responses to deviating group 
members—regardless of the direction of deviance—is whether or not group 
members behave in line with the group’s expectations. Deviance, whether it is 
positive or negative, undermines the legitimacy of the group’s values and 
distinctiveness, and poses a threat to the positive social identity. Consequently, 
groups derogate deviant group members as a way to protect the group’s 
positive social identity. In turn, these negative responses have a major impact 
on the deviating target, as rejection has been shown to threaten basic needs 
and mirrors physical pain (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; 
Williams et al., 2005). Acting in line with the group’s expectations is thus not 
only beneficial for individual group members’ self-esteem because it validates 
their positive social identity and commands respect (e.g., Branscombe et al., 
2002); it also avoids painful rebukes from the group.  
Thus, an important function of intragroup evaluations is that they 
validate the positive social identity. In particular, evaluations that reveal a 
discrepancy between an individual’s behavior and the group’s expectations are 
useful, because they indicate a potential threat to the group’s positive social 
identity. These evaluations can consequently be used to reprimand deviating 
group members and to elicit desired behaviors that validate the group norms. 
Group members are in turn motivated to gain ingroup respect and to avoid the 
costs of being reprimanded by acting in line with the group’s expectations. 
Thus, intragroup evaluations can motivate individual group members to 
display desirable behavior and ultimately validate the group’s positive social 
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identity. With the research described in the current dissertation, I aim to 
further examine the impact of intragroup evaluations on group members’ 
motivational responses, by distinguishing between two different evaluative 
domains: Morality and competence. 
 
The evaluative domains of morality versus competence 
Social judgments generally seem to differ along two fundamental domains: 
Competence and warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). However, in examining what drives the 
behavior of individuals in groups, the focus of past research has almost solely 
been on judgments of competence (e.g., Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & 
Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Ouwerkerk & Ellemers, 2002). Evaluations of 
abilities and task performance are seen as important indicators of individual 
and group success in terms of outcomes and resources, and determine the 
status of both the individual and the group (e.g., Fiske et al., 2002). 
Evaluations of warmth have been considered as an alternative source of 
esteem, or as a source of information that qualifies the competence judgments 
(i.e., cooperative or competitive intentions towards others; Fiske et al., 2002). 
Recent research, however, demonstrated that within the warmth cluster 
sociability judgments (i.e., friendliness, likeability) can and should be 
distinguished from morality judgments (i.e., trustworthiness, honesty; Leach, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). This research has caused a shift in focus from 
competence judgments as the main driving force behind motivated behavior to 
the importance of morality judgments for individuals and groups. 
Indeed, various literatures describe morality as a primary source of value 
for the self, others, and groups. On the individual level, people across different 
cultures consider moral values to be among the most important guiding 
principles in their lives (Dahlsgaard, Peterson, & Seligman, 2005; Schwartz, 
1992), and people desire having a moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Monin 
& Jordan, 2009). When judging others, people primarily consider information 
about morality (Wojciszke, 1994), and value characteristics that are indicative 
of morality—such as trustworthiness—the most (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 
2007). At the group level, morality is seen as essential for survival and 
cooperation (e.g., De Waal, 1996; Skitka, 2003). Moreover, morality is argued 
to regulate the behavior of individuals in groups (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 
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2012; Leach et al., 2013). In sum, research has alluded to the importance of 
morality by showing that—both at the interpersonal and the group level—
people want to be considered moral and want to belong to moral groups.  
Considering the centrality of morality for people’s identity, it stands to 
reason that individuals care deeply about judgments regarding their own and 
relevant others’ (i.e., group members’) morality. An additional reason for the 
importance of morality judgments is provided by research on the asymmetry 
of morality judgments in terms of attributional diagnosticity during impression 
formation (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). That is, negative information 
about morality is perceived to be more diagnostic of individual dispositions 
than negative information about competence. The opposite is argued for 
positive information: Positive information about competence is perceived as 
more diagnostic of the individual than positive information about morality. 
Negative morality judgments in particular have thus been argued to be valuable 
sources of information because they are considered to be diagnostic, stable, 
and therefore of predictive value in terms of future behavior (Martijn, Spears, 
Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987). Not surprisingly then, people are particularly attuned to morality 
judgments; they possess a certain degree of moral attentiveness (Reynolds, 
2008). Continuing this line of reasoning, it is also not surprising that morality 
judgments elicit strong affective responses in people (Skitka, Bauman, & 
Sargis, 2005; Wojciszke, 2005) and, as outlined in more detail below, impact on 
the regulation of individual motivation and behavior.  
At the individual level, morality affects the behavioral choices that people 
make. Generally speaking, morality judgments impact on individuals’ self-
regulatory efforts and motivation to refrain from behaving inhumanly and to 
strive to behave humanly (Bandura, 1999). Prior displays of immoral behavior 
are argued to threaten one’s sense of self-worth, and consequently individuals 
engage in compensatory behaviors in an effort to regain their sense of esteem 
and identity. These ‘moral cleansing’ effects have been related to different 
compensatory behaviors, such as pro-social behaviors like donating to charity 
and volunteering (e.g., Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & 
Medin, 2009). Contrary, prior displays of moral behavior are argued to have 
affirmed the individual’s esteem and identity (i.e., the individual has established 
moral credentials), and therefore allow the individual to temporarily refrain 
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from moral behavior (because engaging in moral behavior is often costly and 
effortful). This ‘moral licensing’ has been related to a range of immoral 
behaviors, such as cheating (Jordan et al., 2011; Sachdeva et al., 2009). These 
effects of morality judgments on subsequent behavior are not only 
demonstrated when the morality judgment concerned individuals’ own prior 
behavior, but also when the morality judgment concerned the behavior of 
others. That is, individuals display vicarious (im)moral behavior in response to 
witnessing (im)moral behavior of others. On the one hand, research has 
demonstrated that when one’s group has established moral credentials by 
behaving in a nonprejudiced manner, individuals are more willing to 
subsequently express prejudiced attitudes (i.e., vicarious moral licensing; 
Kouchaki, 2001). On the other hand, the unethical behavior of one’s group 
member can also enhance individuals’ subsequent cheating behavior (i.e., 
moral contagion), arguably because individuals infer social norms from the 
morality judgments of others’ behavior (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).  
Other lines of research examined the impact of morality on individual 
behavior by focussing on decision making in so-called moral dilemmas. 
Whereas developmental psychology has traditionally argued for a key role of 
cognition in moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969), more recent research 
argues for “the new synthesis in moral psychology”, emphasizing the role of 
emotion and intuition in moral decision making (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 2008; Haidt 
& Kesebir, 2010). By employing research methods such as the trolley and 
footbridge dilemmas—in which individuals are confronted with the dilemma 
of saving five people at the expense of one, or saving five people at the cost of 
harming one, respectively (e.g., Greene et al., 2001)—the role of affect and 
emotion-related brain areas in moral decision making are investigated (Greene 
& Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Haidt, 
Koller, & Dias, 1993). In summary, as outlined above, an extensive body of 
research demonstrated the impact of morality judgments on the regulation of 
individual motivation and behavior.    
At the group level, morality judgments also impact on motivation and 
behavior regulation. Morality is seen as an important regulator of social 
relationships (Rai & Fiske, 2011) and affects intergroup relations. For example, 
it has been argued that liberals and conservatives have different moral 
standards (Haidt & Graham, 2007), which has implications for the role of 
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morality in social regulation and justice (for a discussion see Janoff-Bulman et 
al., 2009; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). More generally, morality appears to 
be an important domain of social categorization, even more so than is the case 
for competence (Van Leeuwen, Park, & Penton-Voak, 2012). Morality 
judgments, compared to competence judgments, guide information gathering 
(Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011) and dominate impression 
formation when judging other groups (Brambilla, Sacchi, Rusconi, Cherubini, 
& Yzerbyt, 2011). When considering the ingroup, morality judgments are more 
important than competence judgments for a positive evaluation (Leach et al., 
2007) and guide the behavioral choices of individual group members 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008). That is, group members are 
motivated to act in line with the group’s moral standards, because they 
anticipate gaining ingroup respect by behaving in this way (Pagliaro, Ellemers, 
& Barreto, 2011). In addition, morality judgments about a newcomer 
determine group members’ willingness to help the newcomer adjust (Pagliaro, 
Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, & Ellemers, 2013).  
Taken together, different literatures describe the impact of morality 
judgments on motivation and behavior-regulation at the individual, 
interpersonal, and group level. The current research operates at the 
intersection of these interpersonal and group processes by examining the 
impact of morality judgments in intragroup relations. Specifically, in the 
experiments reported in this dissertation I investigate how morality judgments, 
compared to competence judgments, affect the motivational responses of 
individual group members. In doing so, the current research aims to enhance 
our understanding of how morality regulates motivation and behavior within 
groups. Before providing an overview of the research described in this 
dissertation, I will first elaborate on the concept of morality, and subsequently 
describe different aspects of group members’ motivational responses—affect, 
cognition, psychophysiology, behavior—on which these morality judgments 
may impact.    
 
Morality defined 
Considering the extensive body of research on morality judgments, part of 
which is reviewed above, it is both surprising and important to note that there 
is no generally accepted definition of morality. Morality is sometimes defined 
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as that which is good and right (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002), as consisting of 
generic virtues such as care vs. harm (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham, 
Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011), or as indicated by specific traits 
such as honesty and trustworthiness that can characterize individuals or groups 
(e.g., Leach et al., 2007). Regardless of the level of abstraction at which 
morality is defined, however, there seems to be a general consistency regarding 
the content of what exactly constitutes morality, namely trustworthiness. 
Trustworthiness is a necessity for inferences about morality, because it is what 
people find most desirable in others, it is viewed similar across societies, and it 
is most beneficial for interacting and cooperating with others (for an overview 
see Leach et al., 2013). Trustworthiness thus appears to be the most important 
aspect underlying notions of  “right” and “wrong”, which can be expressed by 
endorsing the moral foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007) of Care/Harm and 
Fairness/Reciprocity, both to others (Ingroup/Loyalty and 
Authority/Respect) and to the self (Purity/Sanctity). These virtues can in turn 
be deduced to concrete personality traits that pertain to trustworthiness, such 
as sincerity and honesty. These traits indicate how individuals relate to others, 
and it has been shown that people judge these to be moral traits (Leach et al., 
2007; Leach et al., 2013). The social implications of morality judgments—
besides their conceptual content—are, however, pivotal to understanding the 
impact of morality in groups (e.g., Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). In this 
dissertation, I therefore primarily focus on the social implications of morality 
judgments rather than on the content of the morality judgments per se.  
 
Motivational responses 
As outlined earlier, morality vs. competence judgments of group members’ 
behavior are argued to have an impact on their motivational responses. 
Motivation refers to the way in—and degree to—which individuals try to 
attain their goals (e.g., Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Higgins, 1997; Locke & 
Latham, 1990; 2002; Pinder, 1998). The literature on motivation generally 
distinguishes between two basic strategies for self-regulation towards goal 
attainment: The first strategy aims at approaching positive outcomes, ideals, 
and challenges; while the second strategy aims at avoiding negative outcomes, 
obligations, and threats (e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 
1990; Higgins, 1997). These motivations have been linked to different 
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responses in terms of affect, cognitions, psychophysiology, and behavior (e.g., 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996, Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1997). For 
example, approach motivation has been associated with positive affect, 
whereas avoidance motivation has been associated with negative affect (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Carver et al., 2000). Motivational 
responses—whether affective, cognitive, psychophysiological or behavioral—
can thus be perceived as responses that follow goal pursuit and are affected by 
the degree to which goal striving is effective. 
Connecting these insights to intragroup evaluations suggests that 
validation of the group’s positive social identity is a goal that group members 
highly value, and that intragroup evaluations are informative of the extent to 
which attainment of this goal is met. Indeed, people have a “sociometer” that 
monitors the degree to which they are included or excluded by others, and 
motivates them to behave in ways that maintain their connections with others 
(Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). Whereas intragroup evaluations can 
indicate that goal striving is successful, evaluations can also reveal a 
discrepancy between the individual’s behavior and the group’s expectations, 
indicating a less successful pursuit of the positive social identity. I argue that 
the morality judgments of the group are more important indicators of group 
members’ successful goal pursuit than the group’s competence judgments, and 
that these judgments consequently elicit different motivational responses in 
group members. In order to examine this notion, I compare how morality and 
competence judgments impact on group members motivational responses, in 
terms of affect, cognition, psychophysiology, and behavior. I will next 
elaborate on each of these responses.  
 
Affective responses 
When considering the impact of an event, the emotional response is intuitively 
one of the first that individuals attend to (i.e., how does it feel). In general, 
people categorize emotions in terms of valence (pleasant – unpleasant) and 
degree of arousal (high – low; Russell, 1980). Although both the valence and 
intensity (i.e., arousal) of affective responses have been linked to motivational 
consequences (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010), affective valence directly 
emerges from motivation (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Put differently, goal 
pursuit leads to the experience of positive and/or negative affect. When goal 
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striving is successful, individuals report positive feelings such as happiness, 
enthusiasm, and excitement. In a similar vein, when goal striving is 
unsuccessful, people generally experience negative feelings, such as anxiety, 
sadness, and despair. Because one of the aims of the current dissertation is to 
examine how intragroup evaluations impact on the direction of the affective 
experience rather than on the intensity of the affective responses, I specifically 
focus on the valence dimension of affect.  
 
Cognitive responses 
Research on motivation and coping has illuminated the ways in which goal 
pursuit can affect cognitive responses. Individuals’ coping ability with regard to 
any given situation is indicated by their cognitive appraisals of how the 
situational demands relate to their currently available personal resources 
(Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Two kinds of cognitive appraisals can be 
distinguished: Primary and secondary appraisals. Primary appraisals refer to the 
immediate assessment of the stakes for one’s self-esteem in terms of 
situational demands (i.e., danger, uncertainty). Secondary appraisals refer to the 
degree of available resources (i.e., abilities) to overcome or solve the situation 
whilst benefiting, or without harming, one’s self-esteem. Once a situation is 
appraised as a potential threat to one’s self-esteem (i.e., demanding in terms of 
e.g., uncertainty, required effort), cognitive appraisals of personal resources 
(i.e., knowledge, skills) thus determine one’s perceived coping ability.  
In situations where group members are evaluated on the extent to which 
their behavior is in line with the group’s standards, this implies an immediate 
risk for their self-esteem. That is, if the evaluation indicates that there is a 
discrepancy between the group’s expectations and the individual’s behavior, 
the positive social identity of the group is undermined. Intragroup evaluations 
are thus demanding in the sense that they are likely to be primarily appraised as 
a potential threat to one’s positive social identity. In the current dissertation, I 
therefore focus on group members’ cognitive appraisals as indicating the 
balance between the situational demands and personal resources in coping 






According to the Biopsychosocial model (BPSM) of challenge and threat, 
appraisals of a situation in terms of situational demands and personal resources 
also induce different psychophysiological states (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, 
2000; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). When situational demands outweigh 
individual resources, a state of threat emerges. Conversely, when individual 
resources outweigh situational demands, a state of challenge emerges. The 
BPSM focuses specifically on motivated performance situations—situations 
that require instrumental responses in terms of affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral actions that can be evaluated—because these situations are 
engaging and goal relevant (e.g., working on a group task, giving a 
presentation). Although often discussed as similar, challenge and threat differ 
from approach-avoidance energization models of motivation (for a discussion 
see Blascovich, 2008b). Whereas both challenge and threat states are engaging 
and goal relevant, both involve approach tendencies. In a state of threat, 
however, there simultaneously is a desire to avoid. The BPSM thus describes 
motivational states along a bipolar motivational continuum ranging from threat 
to challenge, because both contain approach, but are separated by their level of 
avoidance.  
The BPSM also describes how specific patterns of cardiovascular 
markers indicate the motivational states of challenge and threat. Because both 
challenge and threat involve approach tendencies and engagement, both 
involve activation of the sympathetic neural and adrenal medullary (SAM) axis. 
SAM activation involves sympathetic nervous system activity, which mobilizes 
the body in stressful situations that require action (flight-or-flight responses). 
This produces increases in myocardial (i.e., heart muscle) contractility, visible 
in increased heart rate (HR) and decreased pre-ejection period (PEP; an index 
of left ventricular contractile force). The epinephrine released due to SAM 
activation further increases HR which results in increased cardiac output (CO; 
the amount of blood in liters that is pumped through the heart per minute), 
but also leads to a dilation of the arteries, resulting in decreased total peripheral 
vascular resistance (TPR; the resistance of blood flow through the arterial 
system). Challenge states primarily involve SAM activation. In a state of threat, 
however, there is not only SAM activation but simultaneously also activation 
of the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis. HPA activation leads to the 
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release of cortisol which inhibits the effects of SAM activation on TPR, 
resulting in an increase in TPR and decrease in CO. Based on SAM and HPA 
activity, which lead to measurable cardiovascular responses (HR, PEP, CO, 
TPR), challenge and threat motivational states can thus be distinguished. First, 
task engagement and goal relevance (a fundamental characteristic of motivated 
performance) are indicated by an increase in HR and a decrease in PEP. 
Second, a combination of CO and TPR index challenge and threat: Challenge 
is marked by relatively high CO and low TPR, whereas threat is marked by 
relatively low CO and high TPR. Taken together, both challenge and threat 
states involve SAM activation, indicating approach tendencies towards a goal 
in terms of task engagement and goal relevance. Additional HPA activity 
indicates simultaneous avoidance tendencies in threatening, but not 
challenging, situations. Challenge states thus represent a relative efficient 
pattern of cardiovascular reactivity during motivated performances (more and 
easy blood flow through dilated arteries), whereas threat states represent a 
rather inefficient pattern of cardiovascular reactivity (reduced blood flow 
through constricted arteries).  
Over the last years, research on the BPSM has associated the 
motivational states of challenge and threat (and their cardiovascular correlates) 
to specific cognitive and behavioral outcomes. In general, and parallel to the 
cognitive demands/resources ratio, challenge facilitates better performance 
than threat (see Blascovich, 2008b for a review). For example, challenge states 
enhance subsequent athletic performance relative to threat states (Blascovich, 
Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & Weisbuch, 2004), as well as academic performance 
(Seery, Weisbuch, Hetenyi, & Blascovich, 2010). Depending on the nature of 
the task, threat states may however also facilitate performance compared to 
challenge states. In tasks that require vigilance and rigidity, threat has, for 
example, been related to better performance outcomes than challenge (De Wit, 
Scheepers, & Jehn, 2012). In the long run, challenge and threat states have 
different implications for health. For example, threat can have negative health 
effects; it has been associated with cardiovascular diseases, immune system 
dysfunction, and mental health problems such as anxiety and depression 
(Blascovich, 2008a). 
At the interpersonal and group level, challenge and threat motivational 
states have been, among others, related to social comparison, stigma, and 
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stereotype threat. For example, upward interpersonal comparison induces a 
relative state of threat, whereas downward comparison is associated with a 
state of challenge (Mendes, Blascovich, Major, & Seery, 2001). As for 
understanding the motivational underpinnings of intergroup relations, research 
has demonstrated that interacting with stigmatized others is associated with 
threat rather than challenge (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & 
Kowai-Bell, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). In 
addition, the BPSM provided insight in the motivational implications of 
stereotype threat effects (Vick, Seery, Blascovich, & Weisbuch, 2008).  
Only recently research has begun to examine how the BPSM of challenge 
and threat relate to intragroup processes. For example, deviance in recently-
formed teams is associated with threat rather than challenge (Cleveland et al., 
2011), whereas in other studies deviance of an ingroup member yielded no 
clear distinction between challenge and threat, or evoked a challenge response 
(Frings, Hurst, Cleveland, Blascovich, & Abrams, 2012). In the current 
dissertation, I aim to further examine the motivational underpinnings of 
intragroup processes. Considering that intragroup evaluations regarding the 
legitimacy of the positive social identity require immediate actions of the 
individual, they meet the requirements of a motivated performance situation. 
Hence, the evaluations should impact on group members’ motivational 
responses in terms of challenge and threat motivational states. This is relevant 
to our understanding of how intragroup morality and competence judgments 
impact on group members’ motivational responses. More specifically, these 
cardiovascular indices go beyond group members’ conscious and self-
presentational motives and provide insight in their implicit motivational 
responses. In several of the reported experiments in the current dissertation, I 
therefore examine the cardiovascular indices of challenge and threat 
motivational states in response to intragroup morality and competence 
evaluations. 
 
Behavioral responses  
When examining motivational responses, an investigation of behavior, or 
behavioral intentions, can also provide a fruitful source of information. 
Behavioral responses can be examined at the individual level, for example in 
terms of task performances, or at the group level, such as behavior directed 
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towards others, which can be either members of the own group (intragroup 
interactions) or members of an outgroup (intergroup interactions). So far I 
have discussed individual responses to intragroup evaluations in terms of affect, 
cognition and psychophysiology. Considering that the aim of the current 
dissertation is to examine the impact of intragroup evaluations on group 
members’ motivational responses, I will examine motivated behavioral 
responses in an intragroup setting. In other words, in the current dissertation, I 
will investigate individuals’ behavioral responses towards other group members 
who pose a potential threat to the group’s positive social identity. These 
behavioral responses—both intentions and actual behavior—follow from the 
morality and competence judgments of other group members and are thus 
aimed at protecting the group’s positive social identity.  
As outlined above, groups are inclined to undertake action in order to 
protect its positive social identity when a potential threat arises. Group 
members, or prospective group members, who deviate from the group’s 
standards, pose such a threat. In general, behavioral responses aimed at 
protecting the positive social identity can be divided into two categories: One 
consisting of inclusive forms of rebukes, and one consisting of social rejection 
and exclusion. Inclusive forms of rebukes include derogation and attempts to 
conform the deviant by teaching appropriate behaviors, whilst allowing the 
deviant to remain a member of the group (e.g., Marques et al., 1988; Moreland 
& Levine, 1982; Pinto et al., 2010). Such forms of punishment keep the 
deviance within the group, which can in itself serve as an identity protecting 
strategy (Hornsey, De Bruijn, Creed, Allen, Ariyanto, & Svensson 2005; Van 
Leeuwen, Van den Bosch, Castano, & Hopman, 2010). These inclusive forms 
of punishment are thus aimed at correcting the deviant, and can be labeled as 
socializing responses (e.g., Moreland & Levine, 1982). Other forms of 
punishments, such as rejection and social exclusion, deny or withhold 
membership from the deviant and have a major negative impact on the 
deviant’s well-being (e.g., Van Leeuwen et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). In 
several of the experiments reported in this dissertation, I included both types 
of rebukes, and examine behavioral responses towards prospective group 





Overview of the current dissertation 
Intragroup evaluations provide a group with valuable insights in the extent to 
which individual group members contribute to the group’s positive social 
identity, and can help to define and elicit desirable behavior from group 
members. These evaluations affect group member’s motivational responses 
and are aimed to validate and secure their positive social identity. I propose, 
however, that the impact of such evaluations depends on the evaluative 
domain in question. Specifically, I argue that the impact of intragroup 
evaluations on group members’ motivational responses depends on whether 
group members are evaluated in terms of morality or competence. In doing so, 
I adopt a social identity approach by building on the premise that a social 
identity can motivate individual group members. That is, I examine the impact 
of morality and competence judgments on individuals’ motivational responses 
in groups by investigating intragroup evaluations from different perspectives, 
namely evaluations of 1) group member’s own prior behavior, 2) another group 
member’s behavior, as well as 3) the behavior of a prospective group member. In 
addition, I incorporate different types of motivational responses—affective, 
cognitive, psychophysiological, and behavioral—and vary those along different 
intragroup perspectives. That is, in Chapter 2, I examine the impact of the 
group’s morality and competence judgments about group members’ own prior 
behavior, and focus specifically on affective and cognitive motivational 
responses. In Chapter 3, I examine how morality and competence judgments 
of group members’ own prior behavior, as well as another group member’s 
behavior, impact on psychophysiological motivational responses. Finally, in 
Chapter 4, I examine the impact of morality and competence judgments of 
prospective group members on psychophysiological and behavioral 
motivational responses towards the prospective group member.  
In the experiments reported in the following empirical chapters, I 
operationalized morality and competence at the trait level. Traits, or 
characteristics, are inferred from behavioral observations, and give rise to 
expectations about future behavior. In order to examine the impact of 
intragroup evaluations of own or a group member’s behavior or 
characteristics, some degree of trait inferences is involved. That is, intragroup 
evaluations also include an assessment of likely future behavior, which are 
based on the trait inferences derived from the currently evaluated behavior. 
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Defining morality and competence at the trait level therefore seemed the 
appropriate level of operationalization when examining the social implications 
of intragroup judgments. Following prior research on moral and competence 
traits (e.g., Leach et al., 2007), morality is defined as trustworthiness, honesty, 
and sincerity; competence is defined as competencies, intelligence, and skills.  
Considering the differences in diagnosticity between morality and 
competence judgments (e.g., Skowronksi & Carlston, 1987), I compare the 
impact of negative morality and competence judgments with the impact of 
positive judgments on the domain of morality and competence in multiple of 
the reported experiments in this dissertation. The general prediction is that, 
regarding the importance of morality for individuals’ identity, morality 
judgments have a more pronounced impact on group members’ motivational 
responses than competence judgments. I will next present a short overview of 
each of the empirical chapters that examine this general hypothesis.  
 
Chapter 2  
In the three experiments that comprise this chapter, group members’ affective 
and cognitive responses towards the group’s morality and competence 
evaluations of their own behavior were examined. In Experiment 2.1a, group 
members reflected on their own prior behavior that was negatively evaluated 
by the group in terms of morality or competence. Their affective responses 
with regard to the evaluation were assessed, and it was predicted that 
evaluations of one’s immoral behavior induce more negative affect than 
evaluations of incompetent behavior. The aim of Experiment 2.1b was to 
investigate whether this might occur because morality evaluations generate 
more intense affective responses overall. Group members reflected on their 
own prior behavior that was positively evaluated by the group, and it was 
predicted that being evaluated as competent by others in a group elicits more 
positive affect than being evaluated as moral. Experiment 2.2 again focused on 
negative morality and competence evaluations, but included additional 
measures of group members’ cognitive responses. I assessed how negative 
morality (vs. competence) evaluations impact on group members’ perceived 
coping ability, and predicted that negative morality judgments of one’s prior 
behavior would diminish group members’ perceived coping ability compared 
to negative competence judgments. In addition, Experiment 2.2 also examined 
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whether group members’ affective and cognitive responses are affected by a 
new opportunity to restore their image as a moral group member. In this 
chapter, I thus investigated whether the initial impact of negative morality 
rather than competence judgments on group members’ affective and cognitive 
responses can be overcome when group members are given a chance to 
restore their image.    
 
Chapter 3 
In Chapter 3, I examined how negative morality and competence judgments of 
one’s own and another group member’s behavior impact on 
psychophysiological responses. I predicted that negative morality judgments 
with the aim of improving group members’ behavior might backfire, because 
these raise a motivational state of threat rather than challenge. In two 
experiments, group members worked on a group task while cardiovascular 
indices of challenge and threat motivational states were measured following 
the BPSM (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). In Experiment 3.1 participants 
recalled their own prior behavior evaluated as immoral or incompetent by the 
group; in Experiment 3.2 participants were exposed to an ingroup member’s 
prior behavior evaluated as immoral or incompetent. I assessed the prediction 
that negative morality judgments induce a state of threat rather than challenge, 
whereas negative competence judgments induce a challenge rather than threat 
response. Moreover, I predicted that the pattern of psychophysiological 
motivational responses would be similar in both experiments—in other words, 
regardless of whether the judgment concerned own prior behavior or the prior 
behavior of another group member. In this chapter I thus investigated whether 
negative morality judgments, which often tend to be used to motivate group 
members to adapt their behavior, are effective or might actually be counter-
effective.  
 
Chapter 4  
What determines whether an individual will be accepted by, or excluded from, 
a group? In this chapter, I examined group members’ behavioral responses 
towards prospective group members depending on how they compare to the 
group in terms of morality or competence. In three experiments, I examined 
the overall prediction that the morality of prospective group members has 
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more impact on the group’s tendency to accept versus exclude them than their 
competence. In Experiment 4.1, group members were presented with an 
individual who lacked morality or competence; in Experiment 4.2, the 
prospective group member excelled in morality or competence. The level of 
identity threat that the prospective group member aroused was assessed, as 
well as group members’ tendency to accept and socialize, or to exclude the 
prospective group member. In Experiment 4.3, I directly compared responses 
to prospective group members who either lacked or excelled in morality or 
competence. In addition, psychophysiological measures were included to 
assess group members’ stress and coping responses when considering the 
credentials of a prospective group member. It was predicted that due to the 
social identity threat they impose, individuals who lack morality are more likely 
to be excluded from the group than individuals lacking competence. 
Conversely, the group should be keener to include individuals who can 
contribute to the group’s morality rather than its competence. Overall, the 
experiments described in Chapter 4 examined the notion that the morality, 
rather than the competence, of prospective group members elicits more 
pronounced motivated behavioral responses from group members. 
 
In sum 
The experiments reported in the three empirical chapters that follow examine 
the impact of intragroup morality and competence judgments on group 
members’ motivational responses. Specifically, I examined the effect of 
morality and competence judgments on group members’ affective responses 
(Chapter 2), cognitive responses (Chapter 2), psychophysiological responses 
(Chapters 3 and 4), and behavioral responses (Chapter 4). In the final chapter 
(Chapter 5: General Discussion) I reflect on the key findings and implications 
of these findings for moral psychology and group processes. Because the 
empirical chapters were written as independent research articles, readers might 
notice some overlap in the theoretical introductions and method sections. The 
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We are evaluated on a daily basis by others, such as family members, friends, 
and co-workers. Behavioral evaluations often serve the purpose of eliciting and 
encouraging desired behaviors. Consequently, we are motivated to behave in 
ways that will yield respect and esteem from important others. This is 
particularly the case when the judgments of others are relevant to us, for 
example because these others belong to the same group. But how do these 
evaluations shape our feelings and behaviors? Whereas negative evaluations 
have a major impact on individuals (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, 
& Vohs, 2001 for a review) and may consequently be used to elicit behavioral 
change, they can also be counter-effective,  for example when such evaluations 
increase individuals’ perceptions of threat (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001). In 
the current research, we propose that the impact of a behavioral evaluation in a 
salient group context depends on whether the evaluation concerns behavior 
indicative of one’s morality or competence. As will be outlined in more detail 
below, we argue that criticism of one’s moral behavior is experienced more 
negatively—both in terms of affect and perceived coping ability—than 
criticism of one’s competence. In addition, we argue that group members can 
overcome the negative experience triggered by moral criticism when presented 
with an opportunity to restore their moral image in the group.    
In group contexts, much of the behavior of individual group members is 
driven by concerns for a positive social identity. Research examining how 
individuals and groups compare to each other has mainly focused on competence 
judgments (e.g., Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993). 
Evaluations of abilities and task performance are seen as important indicators 
of individual and group success in terms of outcomes and resources. 
Competence is thus not only a basis for intergroup comparisons; it is also 
considered an important within-group source of membership-esteem. The 
present research complements prior work by also examining morality judgments 
as a source of membership-esteem in groups.  
Several authors have argued for the central role of morality judgments in 
regulating individual behavior in groups as an important reason for why people 
care about morality (e.g., De Waal, 1996; Skitka, 2003). Although the 
importance of morality for groups and its members is acknowledged in various 
literatures, little is actually known about the consequences of morality 
evaluations for individual behavior within groups. While the consequences of 
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morality for individual behavior as incorporated in laws and social norms tend 
to focus on sanctioning negative breaches of morality and the avoidance of 
immoral behavior (e.g., the Ten Commandments: “Thou shalt not…”), we 
examine how group members can overcome this negative impact and display 
moral behavior. In two experiments, we investigate whether the tendency to 
comment on behavior that is seen as lacking morality (vs. competence) 
constitutes the best way to motivate group members to behave more morally 
in the future by assessing its impact on affective responses and coping ability. 
 
Behavioral feedback through intragroup evaluations 
According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people derive 
part of their self-concept from their group membership, and are motivated to 
maintain a positive social identity. In doing so, people evaluate the extent to 
which their past and present behavior contributes to attaining this valued goal 
(Levine & Moreland, 1994). This evaluation process is important for both the 
group and its individual members: The outcome determines whether individual 
group members meet group standards and, as a consequence, affects the 
identity of both the group and its individual members (Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992). It is thus important for individual group members to know whether 
other group members approve of their behavior. The esteem they receive from 
their group depends on feedback indicating whether their behavior is in line 
with the group’s expectations (Moreland & Levine, 1982), and group members 
are motivated to act accordingly (Tyler & Blader, 2003). 
 
The social implications of morality and competence evaluations 
Morality is a primary source of value. Across cultures people consider moral 
values to be the most important guiding principles in their lives (Schwartz, 
1992), and appreciate having a moral identity (Monin & Jordan, 2009). Prior 
research has addressed the content of morality (e.g., Haidt & Graham, 2007) 
and the foundations of moral judgments (Greene et al., 2004). Additionally, it 
has been demonstrated that morality judgments have strong interpersonal 
consequences: Morality information impacts on person perception (Brambilla, 
Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, 1994), elicits strong affective 
responses (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Wojciszke, 2005), and, in particular 
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negative information about morality, seems highly diagnostic of the self 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). These findings all indicate that morality 
judgments of self and others are of particular importance to people’s social 
image and social responses.  
At the group level, morality is seen as essential for individual survival and 
cooperation (e.g., De Waal, 1996; Skitka, 2003). However, in examining what 
drives the behavior of group members, past research has almost solely 
addressed judgments of competence. Other evaluative dimensions, such as 
warmth (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & 
Kashima, 2005), have been considered as alternative sources of individual and 
group-esteem that are used when competence seems lacking. Yet, recent 
research has demonstrated that, within the warmth cluster, sociability ratings 
(i.e., friendliness, likeability) can and should be distinguished from morality 
judgments (i.e., trustworthiness, honesty; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
More relevant to the current work, there is now converging evidence that 
morality is most important—more so than competence or sociability—for a 
positive evaluation of the group (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; 
Leach et al., 2007), and for individuals within the group. Moral ingroup norms 
guide the behavioral choices of individual group members more so than 
competence-based ingroup norms (Ellemers et al., 2008), and individuals are 
motivated to act in line with moral ingroup norms as they anticipate gaining 
ingroup respect by enacting their social identity in this way (Pagliaro, Ellemers, 
& Barreto, 2011).  
In sum, research on the importance of morality at both the interpersonal 
and the group level suggests that people want to be considered moral and want 
to belong to moral groups. Thus, generally speaking, living up to the moral 
expectations of the group should be more important for group members than 
behaving in line with the group’s expected level of competence. We therefore 
argue that criticism of one’s moral behavior impacts more negatively on group 
members’ affective responses and coping ability than criticism of one’s 
competence.  
 
Responses to behavioral evaluations 
To gain insight in how intragroup morality and competence evaluations impact 
on group members, we connect to the literature on goal behavior, indicating 
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that aspects of the message (i.e., evaluation) determine its effectiveness in 
eliciting behavioral change (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). The negativity 
bias, for example, states that negative information generally has more impact 
than positive information (Baumeister et al., 2001; Fiske, 1980). Negative 
feedback is thus considered as an effective tool for eliciting desirable behavior. 
Yet, if this negative response is too intense, the outcome can be counter-
effective. Negative information relevant to the self—as is the case with 
behavioral evaluations—has the potential to increase perceptions of threat and 
elicit defensive responses (e.g., Good & Abraham, 2007; Leventhal, 1970).  
The impact of negative self-relevant information is partially determined 
by the individual’s perceptions of self-efficacy (Van ‘t Riet, Ruiter, Werrij, & 
De Vries, 2008), that is, the individual’s perceived ability to cope with the 
situation. Research on stress and coping indicates that subjective appraisals of 
a specific situation depend on how perceived situational demands relate to the 
individual’s available resources to cope with the situation (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1988). When the perception of threat increases, this places situational demands 
at the forefront (e.g., increased required effort, increased uncertainty), lowering 
one’s perceived ability to cope with the situation, compared to when the focus 
is on the coping resources available to the individual (Blascovich, 2008b; 
Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986). Thus, we argue that group 
members’ affective responses to critical comments regarding their morality vs. 
competence impact on their perceived ability to cope with the behavioral 
evaluation.  
 
The current research 
Two central dimensions of interpersonal and group evaluations are morality 
and competence (e.g., Leach et al., 2007). We examine how the outcome of 
such evaluations impacts on group members’ affective experiences and coping 
abilities. Connecting to the literature on evaluative judgments, we propose that 
the impact of the evaluation is affected by both dimension and valence (e.g., 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). That is, whereas positive information about 
competence is perceived as more diagnostic of the self (in its predictive value for 
future behavior) than positive information about morality, negative information 
about morality is likely to be seen as more diagnostic of the self than negative 
information about competence. Thus, we predict that a negative evaluation of 
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one’s moral behavior by others in a group elicits more negative affect than a 
negative evaluation of one’s competence (Hypothesis 1). This is not to say that 
morality judgments always elicit more intense emotions. In fact, we predict 
that a positive evaluation of one’s competence elicits more positive affect than a 
positive evaluation of one’s moral behavior (Hypothesis 2). In addition, the 
negative affect elicited by the critical evaluation of one’s immoral (vs. 
incompetent) behavior is likely to increase the salience of situational demands, 
indicated by a lower ability to cope with the situation. We thus predict that the 
relationship between critical evaluations of immoral and incompetent behavior 
on the one hand and perceived coping ability on the other hand is mediated by 
group members’ initial negative affective responses (Hypothesis 3). 
Intragroup evaluations criticizing one’s moral behavior (rather than one’s 
competent behavior) are regarded as diagnostic of their lack of morality, and as 
a result group members may be discouraged from striving towards being a 
good group member who adheres to the moral behavioral standards of the 
group. Yet, recent research suggests that individuals actually increase moral 
strivings after a moral failure (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). This 
seeming contradiction may be resolved when we separate affective responses 
to evaluations of one’s past behavior from the perceived ability to cope with a 
new opportunity to behave as a good group member. While the importance of 
morality for the group and the individual should be evident from more intense 
negative affective responses to criticism of one’s past moral behavior, a new 
opportunity to show one’s worth as a moral (vs. competent) group member 
should motivate rather than discourage group members since it is likely to 
increase the salience of available coping resources rather than situational 
demands. We predict that this will decrease the negative affective response to 
the prior criticism of one’s morality (vs. competence) and increase the positive 
affective response towards the opportunity to show moral, rather than 
competent, behavior (Hypothesis 4).  
We tested these hypotheses in two experiments. In both studies 
individual group members recalled behavior that was evaluated by other group 
members in terms of morality vs. competence. Experiment 2.1a investigated 
the impact of negative morality vs. competence evaluations on group member’ 
affective responses. Experiment 2.1b assessed positive evaluations to 
demonstrate that the impact of morality judgments is specific for negative 
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evaluations. Experiment 2.2 examined the mediating role of negative affect on 
perceived coping ability, and assessed whether group members can alleviate 
their negative affective response after prior criticism to their morality (vs. 
competence) when offered an opportunity to display moral, rather than 
competent, behavior in a novel group context.  
 
Experiment 2.1a 
Participants in this experiment recalled a situation in which their group 
evaluated their behavior negatively in terms of morality or competence. Next, 
we assessed their affective responses with regard to the recalled situation. We 
predicted that recalling a negative evaluation of one’s moral behavior elicits 
more negative affect than recalling a negative evaluation of one’s competent 
behavior (Hypothesis 1).  
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Sixty-four individuals (36 women, Mage = 30.20 years, SD 
= 13.23) were recruited by undergraduate students as part of their Bachelor 
thesis. Participants consisted of family, friends, and/or colleagues of these 
students. Participants filled out the paper and pencil questionnaire in return for 
a lottery ticket with which they could win one of four gift certificates each 
worth 20 Euros. In a 1-factor (Dimension: Morality vs. Competence) between-
subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions. Participation took approximately 20 minutes. 
 
Procedure. The experiment explained that all people belong to multiple groups, 
and that every group has its own norms and values. The cover story further 
told that we were interested in the value of either morality (i.e., 
trustworthiness, honesty) or competence (i.e., intelligence, skills), depending 
on condition, and how it affects the behavior of group members. Participants 
were then asked to recall a situation in which they had behaved in a way that 
was evaluated as either immoral or incompetent (depending on condition) by 
others in a group context, and to describe both their behavior and how 
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(someone from) their group confronted them with their behavior.1 Participants 
then completed the questionnaire containing the dependent measures.  
 
Measures. All items were presented on 7-point scales (1 = completely disagree to 7 
= completely agree). To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants 
reported the extent to which they recalled a situation in which they were 
negatively evaluated by their group on their 1) moral and 2) competent 
behavior. 
We included a total of 31 emotions in the questionnaire, based on the 
Positive And Negative Affect Scales (PANAS) by Watson and Clark (1988), 
and extended these with several additional emotions. To construct the affect 
scales we conducted a Principle Component Analysis (varimax rotation) and 
selected the emotions that loaded on the first two factors. We then ran the 
analysis again with only those items. These 10 items explained 58.91% of the 
total variance. Eigenvalues were 3.46 for the first factor (i.e., negative affect) 
and 2.43 for the second factor (i.e., positive affect). Both scales consisted of 
five items (negative affect: “worried”, “anxious”, “vulnerable”, “tense”, 
“nervous”, α = .83; and positive affect: “happy”, “enthusiastic”, “inspired”, 
“pleased”, “proud”, α = .80). Participants indicated the extent to which they 
experienced these emotions while recalling their behavior.  
Because we used pre-existing groups rather than experimental groups, we 
controlled for possible individual differences regarding group identification 
and self-esteem. Group identification was measured with four items (Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999; e.g., “I felt connected to the others in this group”; α = 
.86); personal self-esteem was assessed by five items adapted from Rosenberg 
(1965; e.g., “I was satisfied with myself in that situation”; α = .82); and 
membership-esteem was measured using four items (Luhtanen & Crocker, 
1992; e.g., “I was a worthy member of the group”; α = .72). 
                                                 
1 95.2% of participants described a situation in line with the intended manipulation, χ²(1, N = 62) 
= 106.65, p < .001. Participants indicated the following groups in which the evaluation took place: 
51.61% work group (e.g., classmates), 16.13% family, 9.68% friends, 12.90% sports team, 3.22% 
other and 6.45% did not specify the group. An example of immoral behavior is: “It was at a meeting 
of my fraternity, when I was wearing a shirt of a different fraternity. I was called on my loyalty towards my 
fraternity”. An example of incompetent behavior is: “I was supposed to make some arrangements for a show 
on behalf of my fraternity, but I made several mistakes. Eventually it had to be cancelled all together. It was 
considered as something important, they confronted me with it”. Removing participants who failed to 
describe a situation conform condition from the subsequent analyses did not significantly change 




Unless reported otherwise all data were analyzed by means of Analyses of 
Variance with dimension as independent variable.  
 
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful: Participants in the 
morality condition indicated to a stronger extent that they described a situation 
about their immoral behavior (M = 5.03, SD = 1.71) than participants in the 
competence condition (M = 3.13, SD = 2.00), F(1, 62) = 16.81, p < .001, ηp² = 
.21. Contrary, participants in the competence condition indicated to a stronger 
extent that they described a situation about their incompetent behavior (M = 
4.97, SD = 1.73) than participants in the morality condition (M = 3.25, SD = 
1.70), F(1, 62) = 16.02, p < .001, ηp² = .20. As expected, we found no 
differences in group identification, personal self-esteem, and membership-
esteem (all Fs < 1, ps > .5). 
 
Affect. A repeated measures ANOVA with dimension as between-subjects 
factor and affect as within-subject factor revealed a significant main effect of 
affect, F(1, 62) = 6.12, p = .02, ηp² = .09. Participants reported overall more 
negative affect (M = 3.34, SD = 1.28) than positive affect (M = 2.80, SD = 
1.11). As anticipated, the Affect X Dimension interaction was also significant, 
F(1, 62) = 6.84, p = .01, ηp² = .10. Simple main effect analyses revealed the 
predicted effect of dimension on negative affect, F(1, 62) = 4.88, p = .03, ηp² = 
.07. Participants in the morality condition reported more negative affect (M = 
3.69, SD = 1.36) than participants in the competence condition (M = 3.00, SD 
= 1.12). For positive affect, the simple main effect analyses revealed a 
marginally significant effect of dimension, F(1, 62) = 2.94, p = .09, ηp² = .04. 
Participants in the competence condition reported slightly more positive affect 
(M = 3.03, SD = 1.14) than participants in the morality condition (M = 2.56, 
SD = 1.04).  
 
Discussion 
This experiment investigated how negative evaluations of behavior indicating 
one’s morality or competence influences group members’ affective responses. 
Our prediction was supported: Recalling a critical evaluation of one’s immoral 
behavior by others in a group elicited more negative affect than a critical 
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evaluation of one’s incompetent behavior (Hypothesis 1). Not surprisingly, after 
recalling a negative evaluation, participants reported overall more negative 
affect than positive affect. We found no reliable differences between critical 
evaluations of immoral and incompetent behavior on positive affect.  
These results extend previous research, which shows that negative 
information about morality is seen as more diagnostic of the self than negative 
information about competence (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), by empirically 
demonstrating the affective impact of such information. Recalling a critical 
evaluation of one’s immoral behavior constitutes a more intense negative 
affective experience for group members than a critical evaluation of one’s 
incompetence. It might be possible, however, that group members respond 
more intensely—regardless of valence—to morality evaluations than to 
competence evaluations. To rule out this possibility, we conducted a follow-up 
study in which we examined positive evaluations of group members’ moral vs. 
competent behavior.  
 
Experiment 2.1b 
In Experiment 2.1b we asked participants to recall a situation in which their 
behavior was evaluated as moral or competent by others in a group. As 
outlined above, we predicted that recalling a critical evaluation of one’s 
competent behavior elicits more positive affect than recalling a critical 
evaluation of one’s moral behavior (Hypothesis 2), because of the perceived 
diagnosticity of positive information about competence, compared to morality, 
for the self (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). 
 
Method 
Participants & Design. As part of their Bachelor Thesis, undergraduate students 
recruited sixty-five participants among their family, friends, and/or colleagues 
(39 women, Mage = 32.35, SD = 14.53). Similar to the participants in 
Experiment 2.1a, they received a lottery ticket. Using a 1-Factor (Dimension: 
Morality vs. Competence) between-subjects design, participants were randomly 





Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2.1a, expect for the 
valence of our manipulation. Participants recalled a situation in which they 
behaved in a way that was evaluated as moral (competent) by others in a group 
context2, after which they completed the questionnaire.  
  
Measures. A Principal Component Analysis (varimax rotation) showed that the 
same items as selected in Experiment 2.1a loaded on the first two factors, with 
Eigenvalues of 5.18 for the first factor (i.e., positive affect) and 1.84 for the 
second factor (i.e., negative affect), and explained 70.22% of the total variance. 
Both scales were reliable: α = .91 for positive affect, and α = .85 for negative 
affect. Additionally, we measured group identification (α = .85), personal self-
esteem (α = .77), and membership-esteem (α = .78), as well as the 
effectiveness of our manipulations.   
 
Results  
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful: Participants in the 
morality condition indicated to a stronger extent that they described a situation 
about their moral behavior (M = 5.40, SD = 1.22) than participants in the 
competence condition (M = 3.14, SD = 2.05), F(1, 63) = 27.95, p < .001, ηp² = 
.31. Contrary, participants in the competence condition indicated to a stronger 
extent that they described a situation about their competent behavior (M = 
5.40, SD = 1.59) than participants in the morality condition (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.98), F(1, 63) = 23.91, p < .001, ηp² = .27. As expected, we found no 
differences in group identification, personal self-esteem, and membership-
esteem (all Fs < 1, ps > .4). 
 
Affect. A repeated measures ANOVA with dimension as between-subjects 
factor and affect as within-subject factor revealed a significant main effect of 
affect, F(1, 62) = 49.95, p < .001, ηp² = .45. Participants reported overall more 
                                                 
2 92.2% of participants described a situation in line with our manipulation, χ²(1, N = 64) = 99.76, 
p < .001. Participants indicated the following groups in which the evaluation took place: 58.21% 
work group, 11.94% family, 16.42% friends, 8.95% sports team, 1.49% other and 2.98% did not 
specify the group. An example of moral behavior is: “In my group of friends there was a lot of gossip about 
one person. I did not participate with the gossiping. Other friends in the group told me they admired that I stayed out 
of it”. An example of competent behavior is: “We were losing a soccer match. The whole team already gave 




positive affect (M = 4.42, SD = 1.58) than negative affect (M = 2.32, SD = 
1.27). Importantly, the Affect X Dimension interaction was also significant, 
F(1, 62) = 10.51, p = .002, ηp² = .14. Simple main effect analyses revealed a 
main effect of Dimension: As expected, participants in the competence 
condition reported more positive affect (M = 5.12, SD = 1.22) than 
participants in the morality condition (M = 3.64, SD = 1.60), F(1, 62) = 17.47, 
p < .001, ηp² = .22. For negative affect, simple main effect analyses yielded no 
effect of Dimension, F(1, 62) = 1.57, p = .21, ηp² = .02 (M = 2.53, SD = 1.37 




As predicted, Experiment 2.1b showed that recalling a positive evaluation of 
one’s competent behavior by others in a group elicits more positive affect than 
recalling a positive evaluation of one’s moral behavior (Hypothesis 2). These 
results are in line with the idea that positive information about competence is 
more diagnostic of the self than positive information about morality 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Importantly, these results rule out that 
morality evaluations elicit more intense affective responses overall, since a 
                                                 
3 We also analyzed the data of Experiments 2.1a and 2.1b in one combined 2(Dimension: Morality 
vs. Competence) X 2(Evaluation valence: Negative vs. Positive) design. For positive affect, main 
effects of Dimension, F(1, 124) = 18.99, p < .001, ηp² = .13, and Evaluation valence, F(1, 124) = 
50.17, p < .001, ηp² = .29, emerged: Participants in the competence condition reported overall 
more positive affect (M = 4.11, SD = 1.57) than participants in the morality condition (M = 3.08, 
SD = 1.44), and participants in the positive evaluation condition reported overall more positive 
affect (M = 4.42, SD = 1.58)  than participants in the negative evaluation condition (M = 2.80, SD 
= 1.11). The Dimension X Evaluation valence interaction was also significant, F(1, 124) = 5.10, p 
= .03, ηp² = .04. Simple main effect analyses revealed the predicted pattern: When the evaluation 
was positive, participants in the competence condition reported significantly more positive affect 
than participants in the morality condition (p < .001).  
An ANOVA on negative affect also revealed main effects of Dimension, F(1, 124) = 5.96, p = 
.02, ηp² = .05, and Evaluation valence, F(1, 124) = 20.61, p < .001, ηp² = .14. Participants in the 
morality condition reported overall more negative affect (M = 3.13, SD = 1.47) than participants 
in the competence condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.22), and participants in the negative evaluation 
condition reported overall more negative affect (M = 3.34, SD = 1.28) than participants in the 
positive evaluation condition (M = 2.32, SD = 1.27). Although the Dimension X Evaluation 
valence interaction was not significant for negative affect, F(1, 124) = 0.42, p = .52, ηp² = .003, 
simple main effect analyses revealed the predicted pattern: When the evaluation was negative, 
participants in the morality condition reported significantly more negative affect than participants 
in the competence condition (p = .03).  
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positive evaluation of one’s morality made by others in a group triggers a less 
intense affective response than a positive evaluation of one’s competence.   
 
Experiment 2.2 
The second experiment was conducted with two aims in mind. The first aim 
was to test the psychological consequences of the initial affective responses 
with respect to one’s perceived ability to cope with the behavioral evaluation. 
The second aim was to examine whether group members can alleviate their 
negative affective response to a critical evaluation of their immorality when 
offered a new opportunity to display moral behavior. 
Participants in this experiment first recalled critical evaluations of their 
immoral or incompetent behavior by others in a group (as in Experiment 2.1a) 
and were then offered an ostensible opportunity to restore their image by 
behaving morally or competently in a novel group. This procedure allowed us 
to examine whether group members can overcome their initial negative 
affective response when presented with a new opportunity to display moral 
behavior. Therefore, after recalling an evaluation of immoral (or incompetent) 
behavior, we introduced a joint task in a novel group to participants, which 
offered them an opportunity to display behavior indicating and affirming their 
image as a moral vs. competent group member. We manipulated evaluative 
dimension as a between-participants factor and added evaluative focus (recall 
vs. restore) as within-participants factor.  
We expected to replicate the results of Experiment 2.1a, i.e., that recalling 
behavior evaluated as immoral by others in a group elicits more negative affect 
than a recalling incompetent behavior (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, we expected 
the negative affective response as elicited by a critical evaluation of one’s 
immoral behavior (vs. incompetent behavior) to decrease perceived coping 
abilities (Hypothesis 3). However, when offered a new opportunity to restore 
one’s image in the group, we expect this pattern to disappear. Specifically, we 
predict a larger decrease in negative affect and a larger increase in positive 
affect after the prior criticism of one’s morality rather than competence when 
offered a new opportunity to restore one’s image as a moral (vs. competent) 






Participants and Design. Sixty-one undergraduate students (41 women, Mage = 
21.74 years, SD = 3.12) participated and received either 6 Euros or course 
credits for their participation. We employed a 2(Dimension: Morality vs. 
Competence) X 2(Focus: Recall vs. Restore) mixed-design, with dimension as 
between-subjects factor and focus as within-subjects factor. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two dimension conditions. 
 
Procedure. Participants arrived in the laboratory and were seated in separate 
cubicles. The experiment consisted of two parts: The first was ostensibly about 
group values (similar to Experiments 2.1a and 2.1b), and the second part 
would involve solving management dilemmas in a group. We introduced the 
first part of the experiment by providing the same instructions as in 
Experiment 2.1a: Participants recalled own behavior evaluated as immoral 
(incompetent) by others in a group.4 Next, we measured affect, perceived coping 
ability, and additional variables, after which the second part of the experiment 
was introduced.  
In the second part of the experiment, the cover story explained that we 
were interested in the way in which people solve management dilemmas in 
groups. We told participants that these dilemmas often require a trade-off 
between moral and competent considerations, and that we were specifically 
interested in either morality or competence (which always converged with the 
dimension of the recalled evaluation). We then explained that participants 
would be working in a group with two other participants to find agreement on 
the best solution for such dilemmas. We presented this interactive group task 
as an opportunity for participants to show their moral or competent behavior 
towards their group. We explicitly stated: “With this task you can show your 
moral (competent) behavior.” In anticipation of the group task participants 
completed the second questionnaire, again comprising the same dependent 
                                                 
4 88.1% of participants described a situation in line with the intended manipulation, χ²(1, N = 61) 
= 79.74, p < .001. Participants indicated the following groups in which the evaluation took place: 
52.46% work group, 9.84% family, 6.56% friends, 22.95% sports team, 3.28% other and 4.91% 
did not specify the group. Removing participants who failed to describe a situation conform 
condition from the subsequent analyses did not significantly change our results. We therefore 
included those participants in all analyses. 
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measures. After this, participants were fully debriefed, paid, and thanked for 
their participation.5 
 
Measures. All dependent variables were measured on 7-point scales (1 = 
completely disagree to 7 = completely agree). The measures were assessed twice: once 
in the recall condition (phrased in the past tense; similar to Experiments 2.1a 
and 2.1b) and once in the restore condition (phrased in the present tense).  
We included a total of 25 emotions in our questionnaire, by extending 
the Positive And Negative Affect Scales (PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1988) with 
several other emotions. We followed the same strategy as described in 
Experiments 1a and 1b: We conducted a Principal Component Analysis 
(varimax rotation) and selected the emotions that loaded on the first two 
factors to construct our affect scales. These 10 items explained 50.38% of the 
total variance in the recall condition, with Eigenvalues of 3.62 for the first 
factor (i.e., negative affect) and 1.42 for the second factor (i.e., positive affect). 
In the restore condition, the same items explained 51.13% of the total 
variance, with Eigenvalues of 3.48 for the first factor (i.e., positive affect) and 
1.63 for the second factor (i.e., negative affect). Both scales consisted of five 
items (positive affect: “happy”, “interested”, “inspired”, “strong”, “proud”; 
Recall: α = .67; Restore: α = .70, and negative affect: “anxious”, “threatened”, 
“tense”, “nervous”, “guilty”; Recall: α = .75; Restore: α = .71). 
Coping ability (Folkman et al., 1986) was measured with three items (“I 
felt I was able to solve this situation”, “I found it difficult to solve this 
situation” [reverse coded], “I felt insecure about solving this situation” [reverse 
coded], Recall: α = .77; Restore: α = .81).6 We again assessed group 
                                                 
5 In this study participants were attached to apparatus for measuring impedance cardiographic 
(ICG), electrocardiographic (EKG), and blood pressure signals. After the described procedure, 
participants engaged in an additional study in which we explored their cardiovascular responses. 
Analyses of those data are beyond the scope of the current paper.  
6 To confirm that negative affect and perceived coping ability can be considered two separate 
constructs, we conducted a principal component analysis, using varimax rotation, of the eight 
items in both the recall and restore condition. The analysis yielded a 2-factor solution in both 
conditions. In the recall condition, the items explained 59.97% of the total variance, and 
Eigenvalues were 3.34 for the first factor (i.e., negative affect) and 1.45 for the second factor (i.e., 
perceived coping ability). In the restore condition, the items explained 56.85% of the total 
variance, and Eigenvalues were 2.36 for the first factor (i.e., negative affect) and 2.19 for the 
second factor (i.e., perceived coping ability), thus confirming the conceptual distinction between 
negative affect and perceived coping ability. 
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identification (Recall: α = .82; Restore: α = .90), personal self-esteem (Recall: α 
= .77; Restore: α = .87), and membership-esteem (Recall: α = .83; Restore: α = 
.82). 
To check the effectiveness of the dimension manipulation, participants 
indicated, in the recall condition, the extent to which they described immoral 
and incompetent behavior. In the restore condition, participants indicated the 
extent to which the solutions to management dilemmas were aimed at morality 
and competence.  
 
Results 
Unless reported otherwise, the within-subject data were analyzed using 
repeated measures (RM) Analyses of Variance with focus as within-subject 
factor and dimension as between-subject factor. Data from the between-
subject conditions were analyzed using Analyses of Variance with dimension as 
independent variable.  
 
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful in both focus 
conditions. In the morality recall condition participants reported to a stronger 
extent that the described situation was about their immoral behavior (M = 
5.58, SD = 1.23) than participants in the competence recall condition (M = 
4.33, SD = 1.88), F(1, 59) = 9.44, p < .01, ηp² = .14. A similar pattern was 
found in the restore conditions: Participants in the morality restore condition 
reported to a greater extent that the aim of the management dilemmas was on 
morality (M = 6.16, SD = 1.53) than participants in the competence restore 
condition (M = 4.10, SD = 1.40), F(1, 59) = 30.12, p < .001, ηp² = .34. 
Separate analyses for personal self-esteem, membership-esteem, and 
identification yielded main effects of focus: In the restore condition 
participants reported more personal self-esteem (M = 5.71, SD = 1.02) than in 
the recall condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.31), F(1, 59) = 158.10, p < .001, ηp² = 
.73, and more membership-esteem (M = 5.42, SD = 0.96) than in the recall 
condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.49), F(1, 59) = 53.01, p < .001, ηp² = .47. In the 
recall condition participants reported to identify more with their group (M = 
4.37, SD = 1.32) than in the restore condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.50), F(1, 59) 
= 10.14, p < .01, ηp² = .15, consistent with the use of preexisting groups in the 
recall condition and minimal groups (to which people tend to identify less) in 
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the restore condition. Importantly, the interaction with dimension was not 
significant for each of these variables (all Fs < 2.5, ps > .1).  
 
Affect. A repeated measures ANOVA with dimension as between-subject 
factor and focus and affect as within-subject factors yielded a significant Affect 
X Focus interaction, F(1, 59) = 205.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .78. The predicted 
three-way-interaction among Affect, Focus, and Dimension was also 
significant, F(1, 59) = 8.45, p = .005, ηp2 = .12. To disentangle these 
interaction patterns we conducted separate repeated measures ANOVAs for 
the recall and restore conditions.  
Main effects of affect emerged in both the recall condition, F(1, 59) = 
61.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .51, and the restore condition, F(1, 59) = 78.09, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .57. Overall, participants reported more negative affect (M = 4.39, SD = 
1.06) than positive affect (M = 2.72, SD = 0.92) in the recall condition, 
whereas they reported more positive affect (M = 4.44, SD = 0.86) than 
negative affect (M = 2.77, SD = 0.87) in the restore condition. 
More importantly, and in keeping with predictions and the results of 
Experiment 2.1a,  the Affect X Dimension interaction was significant in the 
recall condition, F(1, 59) = 4.37, p = .04, ηp2 = .07 (see Table 2.1). Participants 
reported more negative affect in the morality recall condition than in the 
competence recall condition, F(1, 59) = 4.84, p = .03, ηp2 = .08. Dimension 
had no effect on positive affect in the recall condition, F(1, 59) = 1.78, p = .19, 
ηp2 = .03. The Affect X Dimension interaction was not significant in the 

















Means and Standard Deviations of Affect and Perceived Coping Ability for the Dimension 
Conditions in each Focus Condition (Experiment 2.2) 
 Recall behavior Restore behavior 
 Morality Competence Morality Competence 
 
M         
(SD) 
M           
(SD) 
M       
(SD) 




 2.57a   
(0.79) 
 2.88a     
(1.03) 
 4.53b    
(0.80) 




 4.68c   
(0.94) 
 4.10d     
(1.10) 
 2.63e    
(0.77) 




 3.61i   
(1.29) 
 4.35 j     
(1.48) 
 4.40j    
(1.40) 
 4.25j     
(1.20) 
Note: Means with different subscripts per row and column (for positive and negative affect) differ 




Change in affect. For presentational purposes, we computed difference scores for 
positive and negative affect by subtracting the average affect in the recall 
condition from the restore condition for both subscales. This way, we created 
a single indicator of change in positive and negative affective responses 
between the recall and restore conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA with 
the affect difference scores as within-subject factor and dimension as between-
subject factor yielded a significant main effect of affect, F(1, 59) = 205.60, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .78, as well as the predicted Affect X Dimension interaction, F(1, 
59) = 8.45, p = .005, ηp2 = .12.  
Overall, the changes in positive affect (M = 1.72, SD = 0.97) and 
negative affect (M = -1.62, SD = 1.25) between the recall and restore 
conditions were significant, respectively t(60) = 13.83, p < .001 and t(60) = -
10.12, p < .001. Simple main effect analyses showed that in the morality 
condition, the increase in positive affect (M = 1.97, SD = 0.91) and decrease in 
negative affect (M = -2.04, SD = 0.98) were significantly larger than the 
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increase in positive affect (M = 1.47, SD = 0.99) and decrease in negative 
affect (M = -1.19, SD = 1.36) in the competence condition, respectively F(1, 
59) = 4.14, p = .05, ηp² = .07 for positive affect and F(1, 59) = 8.00, p = .006, 
















Figure 2.1  
Changes in affective responses between the focus conditions as a function of evaluation 
dimension, Experiment 2.2. Displayed are the difference scores (restore minus recall; see 




Perceived coping ability. A marginal significant Focus X Dimension interaction 
was revealed for perceived coping ability: F(1, 59) = 3.74, p = .06, ηp² = .06 
(see Table 2.1). Analyses of the simple main effects demonstrated that 
participants in the morality recall condition reported significant lower 
perceived coping abilities than participants in the competence recall condition, 
F(1, 59) = 4.35, p = .04, ηp² = .07; the latter did not differ from participants’ 




Mediation. To examine whether the effect of dimension on perceived coping 
ability was mediated by affect, we conducted bootstrapping analyses (Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004), using the SPSS macro for simple mediation with 5000 
bootstrap resamples. For the recall condition, coping ability was entered as 
dependent variable, with dimension as predictor and negative affect as 
proposed mediator.7  
The bootstrap results showed that, in the recall condition, the indirect 
effect of dimension on perceived coping ability through negative affect was 
significant with a point estimate of -.27 and a 95% BCa CI of -.6447 to -.0322, 
indicating full mediation (see Figure 2.2). The higher level of reported negative 
affect in the morality recall condition, compared to the competence recall 













Figure 2.2  
Negative affect mediates the relationship between evaluation dimension and perceived coping 






                                                 
7 Since we found no effect of dimension on positive affect in the recall condition, nor on positive 
and negative affect in the restore condition, positive affect was ruled out as potentially mediating 
the link between dimension and perceived coping ability.  
-.46** .58* 
Dimension: 
1 = competence 









This experiment investigated 1) a psychological consequence of the affective 
responses to behavioral evaluations in terms of perceived coping ability, and 2) 
whether group members can overcome their initial negative affective response 
induced by a critical evaluation of one’s immorality (vs. incompetence) when 
offered a new opportunity to behave morally in the group. We replicated the 
results of Experiment 2.1a by demonstrating that a prior critical evaluation of 
one’s immoral behavior by others in a group elicits more negative affect than a 
critical evaluation of one’s incompetent behavior (Hypothesis 1). We also 
showed that, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, a prior criticism of one’s morality 
elicited more negative affect, which decreased perceived coping abilities, as 
compared to a prior criticism of one’s competence. The opportunity to restore 
the critical evaluation induced similar levels of negative affect and perceived 
coping ability for moral and competent behavior, suggesting that such an 
opportunity enhances a focus on available resources rather than situational 
demands—this appraisal is not further affected by evaluative dimension.  
When group members were offered a new opportunity to restore their 
morality or competence, the affective response pattern reversed. Overall, 
participants reported more positive affect than negative affect when offered 
the opportunity to restore their image after a critical evaluation; regardless of 
whether the opportunity concerned moral or competent behavior. In both 
dimension conditions, the opportunity to restore the critical evaluation 
induced a decrease in negative affect and an increase in positive affect, 
compared to considering prior criticism to one’s morality or competence. 
However, the shifts in negative and positive affect were significantly larger 
when the opportunity concerned moral behavior rather than competent 
behavior (Hypothesis 4).  
The results of Experiment 2.2 thus indicate that group members can 
overcome their negative affective response to a prior criticism of their 
morality. The presence of a new opportunity to restore their moral image in 
the group induces a decrease in negative affect, an increase in positive affect, 
and leads to similar coping ability perceptions as an opportunity to restore 






The current research extends prior findings (Ellemers et al., 2008; Leach et al., 
2007; Pagliaro et al., 2011), by showing how critical evaluations of one’s moral 
(vs. competent) behavior by others in a group impact on group members’ 
affective experience and coping abilities. In two experiments, we specifically 
assessed how intragroup evaluations of group members’ behavior indicating 
their morality vs. competence affect their emotional responses and perceived 
coping ability. In both experiments, we were able to rule out that these effects 
are due to differences in (personal or collective) self-esteem or group 
identification resulting from the evaluations received.  
Extending theory and prior research documenting the asymmetrical 
effects of positive vs. negative valence in evaluative judgments (e.g., 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), we observed differential effects of positive vs. 
negative evaluations on affective responses. That is, critical evaluations of 
one’s immoral behavior rather than one’s incompetent behavior elicit a negative 
affective response (Experiment 2.1a and 2.2), whereas critical evaluations of 
one’s competence rather than one’s morality elicit a positive affective response 
(Experiment 2.1b). This corroborates our reasoning that moral criticism has a 
more negative impact on group members than competence criticism, but does 
not generate more intense emotional responses overall. 
Additionally, we demonstrated that the negative affective response to 
critical evaluations of one’s prior immoral rather than incompetent behavior 
elicit coping abilities focusing on situational demands rather than available 
resources resulting in a decreased perceived ability to cope with the evaluation 
(Experiment 2.2). Yet, this aversive reaction can be alleviated when group 
members are presented with a new opportunity to behave morally (Experiment 
2.2). Group members feel equally positive towards and able to cope with a new 
opportunity to behave morally as to behave competently (i.e., increased self-
efficacy; Van ‘t Riet et al., 2008), thereby overcoming their initial negative 
affective response to prior criticisms of their morality.   
 
Implications and future directions  
Recent research established the importance of morality for individuals’ 
personal identity (e.g., Monin & Jordan, 2009) as well as their social identity 
(e.g., Leach et al., 2007). A growing body of research is starting to uncover the 
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processes and consequences of morality for motivation (e.g., Bauman & 
Skitka, 2009; Ellemers et al., 2008; Jordan et al., 2011; Pagliaro et al., 2011). 
The current research connects to research on moral motivation by 
demonstrating the affective consequences and appraisals of morality and 
competence evaluations of group members’ behavior. The literature on 
motivational strategies generally distinguishes between two basic strategies for 
self-regulation: The first aims at approaching positive outcomes, ideals and 
challenges; the second aims at avoiding negative outcomes, obligations and 
threats (e.g., Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 
1997). Positive affect has been linked to an approach motivation, and negative 
affect to an avoidance motivation (e.g., Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999). 
This is relevant to our results because these suggest that evaluations of one’s 
moral and competent behavior elicit different motivational strategies in group 
members. An interesting direction for future research might be to further 
examine whether the motivation towards attaining a moral identity elicits 
different self-regulatory processes and arousal regulation.  
Determining whether and why group members become preoccupied with 
situational demands or focus on their available coping resources is relevant for 
the understanding of individual behavior in groups. A focus on difficulties 
primarily causes people to monitor their behavior, as they try to avoid being 
seen as immoral. This may not always be adaptive to improve the situation or 
their well-being, as it is likely to induce stress (Folkman et al., 1986), and to 
make them reluctant to speak up or show what they are worth for fear of 
doing something wrong. By contrast, a focus on opportunities to behave 
morally—emphasizing the individual’s coping abilities—is more likely to invite 
creative attempts to behave in moral ways, as it challenges the individual to 
find new ways to display his/her morality to the group. Many groups attempt 
to monitor and shape the moral behavior of their members by emphasizing 
what they did wrong in the past. Our data suggest that this may not be the best 
way to encourage individuals to display moral behavior. Indeed, recent studies 
demonstrate the benefits of emphasizing the motivation to display moral 
behavior for group processes and intergroup relations (e.g., Does, Derks, & 
Ellemers, 2011; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Future research might 
further examine how the adoption of motivational strategies to achieve moral 
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goals affects behavioral displays and which is more effective in establishing 
intragroup respect in existing or novel group contexts.  
The current research also contributes to the understanding of group 
dynamics, as we shed light on how group members’ evaluations (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994) of each other induce attempts to conform to the group’s 
norms and to affirm the group’s expectations of individual group members. 
We varied both the dimension and the valence of the behavior central to the 
evaluation process. Implicitly, this conveyed the group’s norms by increasing 
the salience of discrepancies between the moral or competent behavior of the 
individual and the expectations of other group members. Yet, we did not 
examine the extent to which group members’ behavior actually conforms to 
the induced group norm or the group’s expected level of morality and 
competence. An interesting direction for future research might be to address 




Group members’ affective responses and perceived coping abilities towards 
intragroup evaluations are determined by the dimension of the evaluation 
outcome. A critical evaluation of one’s competent, rather than one’s moral, 
behavior induces a positive affective response. By contrast, a critical evaluation 
of one’s immoral (vs. incompetent) behavior elicits a negative affective 
response, which in turn enhances the salience of situational difficulties rather 
than available resources, and decreases group members’ perceived coping 
ability. Moral criticism thus impacts more negatively on group members than 
competence criticism. However, by increasing group members’ perceptions of 
self-efficacy—offering a chance to display moral behavior—the initial negative 
affective response is alleviated, thereby shifting the focus to one’s available 
resources and increased coping abilities. Group members can thus overcome 
their misery after a moral failure and become positively engaged towards an 














Threatened by the Immoral, Challenged by  











This chapter is based on Van der Lee, R., Ellemers, N., & Scheepers, D. 
(2012b). Threatened by the immoral, challenged by the incompetent: 
Cardiovascular responses to intragroup morality vs. competence evaluations. 





Morality judgments have important social implications: They not only provide 
social norms about what one should and should not do; they are also used to 
regulate the behavior of individuals in groups (De Waal, 1996; Ellemers & Van 
den Bos, 2012; Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2013). For example, moral guidelines 
indicating what is normative for the group impact upon behavioral choices of 
group members, and moral (more so than competence) evaluations determine 
group members’ willingness to help a newcomer in the group (Ellemers, 
Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro, Brambilla, Sacchi, D’Angelo, & 
Ellemers, 2013). This suggests that moral disapproval of past behavior might 
be particularly useful as a way to regulate behavioral change. However, is this 
really the case? We propose that the opposite might actually be true and that 
moral disapproval can impede rather than foster behavioral change.  
Why would moral disapproval provide an inefficient way to alter group 
members’ behavior? We argue that the greater psychological impact of 
morality judgments may impede group members’ perceived ability to cope with 
moral disapproval. This implies that the demands of coping with negative 
evaluations are increased when these pertain to morality (rather than 
competence) evaluations. As a result, we predict that negative morality 
evaluations are more threatening and may therefore be less efficient as a way to 
motivate group members to adapt their behavior.  
The aim of the current research is to gain more insight in the 
motivational implications of negative morality vs. competence evaluations in 
group contexts. In two experiments we compare behavior indicative of 
morality to behavior indicative of competence, which are both key sources of 
esteem and success for groups and their members (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & 
Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Leach, Ellemers, 
& Barreto, 2007). In addition, we investigate the social implications of morality 
evaluations by examining judgments of behavior of the self as a group member 
(Experiment 3.1) as well as judgments regarding the behavior of another 
ingroup member (Experiment 3.2). Given that the behavior of other ingroup 
members is self-relevant because this affects one’s social identity, we expect 
similar effects of morality vs. competence evaluations on motivation, 
regardless of whether the judgment concerns one’s own behavior or an 




The motivational implications of morality and competence 
People desire having a moral identity (Monin & Jordan, 2009) and strive to be 
(perceived as) moral (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011). The motivation to 
be seen as moral directly affects displays of moral behavior. That is, individuals 
engage in compensatory behaviors when their moral identity has been called 
into question (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). For example, individuals who 
are reminded of past immoral actions report more prosocial intentions such as 
donating to charity (Jordan et al., 2011). This demonstrates that individuals 
whose behavior is negatively evaluated in terms of morality (e.g., through 
reminders of past immoral acts) increase their striving to act morally. As a 
consequence, it could be argued that moral disapproval of past behavior 
constitutes an effective way to motivate group members to change their 
behavior. However, despite the motivational power of salient moral 
transgressions, individuals can also feel bad as a result of them. For example, 
when group members recall a negative evaluation of their behavior in terms of 
morality (vs. competence), they show more negative affective responses and a 
decrease in their perceived ability to cope with the situation (Van der Lee, 
Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012a). Thus, reminders of immoral acts on the one 
hand increase the desire to act morally, but on the other hand decrease the 
(perceived) ability to do so.  
 
Challenge and threat as motivational states 
The biopsychosocial model (BPSM; Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; Blascovich & 
Tomaka, 1996) describes motivational states during motivated performance 
situations (e.g., giving a speech, working on a group-decision task) along a 
bipolar continuum ranging from “challenge” to “threat”. According to the 
BPSM, appraisals of motivated performance situations in terms of their 
demands (e.g., uncertainty and required effort) and available resources to cope 
with these demands (e.g., knowledge and skills) result in a motivational state of 
challenge vs. threat. More specifically, when situational demands outweigh 
individual resources, a state of threat emerges. Conversely, when individual 
resources match or outweigh situational demands a state of challenge emerges.  
Challenge and threat motivational states are marked by specific patterns 
of cardiovascular reactivity. First, task engagement and goal relevance (a 
fundamental characteristic of motivated performance) are indicated by an 
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increase in heart rate (HR) and a decrease in pre-ejection period (PEP; an 
index of left ventricular contractile force). Second, a combination of cardiac 
output (CO; the amount of blood in liters that is pumped through the heart 
per minute) and total peripheral resistance (TPR; the resistance—constriction 
vs. dilation—of blood flow through the arterial system) index challenge and 
threat: Challenge is marked by relatively high CO and low TPR, whereas threat 
is marked by relatively low CO and high TPR.  
In the context of the BPSM, the motivational states of challenge and 
threat (and their cardiovascular correlates) have been related to specific 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes. For example, challenge has been shown to 
positively correlate with a range of cognitive and physical performance 
outcomes (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010; Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, 
& Weisbuch, 2004; Seery, Weisbuch, Hetenyi, & Blascovich, 2010). Threat, by 
contrast, has been related to rigidity in conflict situations (De Wit, Scheepers, 
& Jehn, 2012) and may have negative health implications in the long run 
(Blascovich, 2008a).  
We propose that differentiating between motivational states of challenge 
and threat provides a powerful tool to understand how group members deal 
with negative morality vs. competence evaluations. We argue that morality 
evaluations generally are more demanding than competence evaluations. First, 
morality evaluations are more important than competence evaluations for a 
positive evaluation of the self (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the group (Leach et 
al., 2007). Second, negative comments about one’s morality are perceived to be 
more diagnostic of the self (being seen as having more predictive value for 
future behavior) than negative comments about one’s competence 
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Finally, prior research has demonstrated that 
critical evaluations regarding morality result in more negative affect (Van der 
Lee et al., 2012a) and identity threat (Kouzakova, Ellemers, Harinck, & 
Scheepers, 2012) as compared to critical evaluations regarding competence. 
These are all factors that potentially increase perceptions of (required) effort, 
thereby enhancing the situational demand-appraisals (e.g., Blascovich, 2008b). 
As a consequence, we predict that negative morality rather than competence 
evaluations are more likely to induce a motivational state of threat instead of 
challenge. Considering the negative implications of threat in terms of cognitive 
and behavioral performance (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, 2010; Blascovich et 
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al., 2004; Seery et al., 2010), morality evaluations might therefore not provide 
the most efficient route to establish behavioral change in group members. 
 
The current research 
In two studies, we expose group members to negative evaluations of moral vs. 
competent behavior by asking them to recall instances of such evaluations of 
their own prior behavior (Experiment 3.1) or by confronting them with such 
evaluations of an ingroup member’s prior behavior (Experiment 3.2). In both 
studies, the evaluations were made in a salient group context. Across studies 
we measured group members’ motivational states through cardiovascular 
markers of challenge and threat. By applying the BPSM of challenge and threat 
we provide novel insight in the motivational states of group members when 
coping with negative intragroup evaluations. We hypothesize that a negative 
evaluation of morality (vs. competence) induces a state of threat rather than 
challenge. We expect this pattern to occur regardless of whether the judgment 
targets own behavior or an ingroup member’s behavior. 
 
Experiment 3.1 
In the first experiment, participants recalled a situation in which their behavior 
was evaluated as either immoral or incompetent by others in a group context. 
Then, in a novel group context created in the lab, a group task was introduced 
for which either morality or competence (depending on condition) was said to 
be the primary performance dimension. In anticipation of the task, participants 
ostensibly had a within-group communication opportunity (by means of a 
video circuit), where they presented their views on how to perform on the 
task. This was the motivated performance situation we focused on to assess 
cardiovascular indices of challenge and threat. We predicted that being 
reminded of own prior behavior evaluated by others in a group context as 
immoral (vs. incompetent) would induce a relative state of threat rather than 
challenge. We also examined whether recalling negative morality vs. 
competence evaluations would lead to differences in collective self-esteem. In 
addition, we measured the perceived stability of behavior displayed during the 
group task as an indicator of situational demand-appraisals. As outlined above, 
one of the reasons why (im)morality judgments might be rather threatening is 
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that they may be seen as more diagnostic of the self—and thus perceived to be 
more stable over time—than incompetence judgments (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987).  
 
Method 
Participants & design. Seventy-three undergraduate students (50 women, Mage = 
21.41 years, SD = 3.19) participated in this experiment. They received 6 Euros 
or course credits for participation. Using a 1-factor (Dimension: Morality vs. 
Competence) between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two experimental conditions. Participation took about 45 minutes. 
 
Procedure. Participants arrived in the laboratory, were seated in front of a 
computer equipped with a webcam, and attached to the apparatus for 
measuring cardiovascular responses (see below). To measure 
electrocardiographic (EKG) and impedance cardiographic (ICG) signals, four 
spot electrodes were placed on participants’ upper and lower back and two on 
their chest. In addition, a blood pressure sensor was attached to the index 
finger of their non-dominant hand. We then took a 5-minute baseline measure 
of their cardiovascular responses.  
Participants were told that the study was concerned with how people 
solve management dilemmas in groups. Participants (who were all referred to 
as “participant 2”) would be collaborating in a group with three other 
(fictitious) participants (indicated as participants “1”, “3”, and “4”) to discuss 
the role of morality [competence] in solving such dilemmas. Ostensibly in order to 
enhance the collaboration and performance on the task, participants were first 
asked to recall a prior situation in which they had behaved in a way that was 
evaluated as either immoral or incompetent (depending on condition) by others in 
a group context. The others in the group were allegedly asked to do the same. 
This served as our manipulation of evaluative dimension.  
Participants then completed a short questionnaire (see below) and were 
presented with several example dilemmas, after which they delivered a speech 
in front of a webcam. During this speech task, participants presented their 
ideas about the role of morality [competence] in solving management dilemmas. 
The speeches recorded by each group member would allegedly be shown to 
the others in the group, with the purpose of forming an impression of each 
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other and facilitating collaboration during the group task. Participants were 
(ostensibly randomly) chosen to record their speech first. They could take up 
to three minutes for their speech. When participants finished their speech, 
which was the motivated performance situation we focused on regarding the 
cardiovascular indices of challenge and threat (e.g., Blascovich et al., 2004; 
Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007; Scheepers, De Wit, 
Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012), they reached the end of the study and were 
debriefed, paid, and thanked for their participation.  
 
Self-report measures. All questions were answered on 7-point scales (1 = completely 
disagree to 7 = completely agree). To check the effectiveness of the manipulation, 
participants reported the extent to which the purpose of the group task was to 
behave morally or competently (“I am going to show my group members how 
moral I am” and “I am going to show my group members how competent I 
am”). We measured private collective self-esteem with four items (Luhtanen & 
Crocker, 1992; e.g., “I am glad to be a member of this group”; α = .67). To 
assess demand-appraisals, we measured perceived stability of behavioral 
evaluations during the group task with two items (“I think my group members 
perceive my behavior as stable” and “I think my group members will not 
change their opinion about me, even if I would behave differently”, r = .42, p 
< .001).   
 
Cardiovascular measures. Electrocardiographic signals (EKG), impedance-
cardiographic signals (ICG), and blood pressure were continuously measured 
during the experiment using a Biopac MP150 system (Biopac Systems Inc., 
Goleta, CA). Electrocardiography was measured using an ECG100 module 
and a Lead I electrode configuration, from which heart rate (HR) is derived. 
For measuring ICG, the NICO100c module was used. It provides measures of 
baseline impedance (Z0) and the rate of change in impedance (dZ/dt), which 
yields indices of cardiac performance (e.g., PEP and CO; see Sherwood et al., 
1990).  
The blood pressure monitor provided a measure of mean arterial 
pressure (MAP) which, in combination with CO, can be used to calculate TPR. 
Cardiovascular data was stored using Acqknowledge software (Biopac Systems, 
Goleta, CA) and manually scored using MATLAB software (The MathWorks, 
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Inc., Natick, MA) following standard guidelines (Sherwood et al, 1990; see also 
De Wit et al., 2012).  
 
Results and Discussion 
The data of five participants were removed from all analyses due to expressed 
suspicion about the cover story, resulting in 68 participants with usable self-
reported data. Due to signal loss,8 we were left with usable cardiovascular data 
of 41 participants.  
 
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction between dimension and the 
manipulation check items, F(1, 66) = 7.43, p = .008, ηp² = .10. Simple main 
effect analysis showed that participants in the morality condition indicated to a 
greater extent that their goal was to behave morally (M = 5.26, SD = 1.12) 
than competently (M = 4.66, SD = 1.30) during the group decision-making 
task, F(1, 66) = 7.23, p = .009, ηp² = .10. Although participants in the 
competence condition did not distinguish between the extent to which it was 
their goal to behave morally (M = 4.97, SD = 1.33) and competently (M = 
5.24, SD = 1.06), F(1, 66) = 1.41, p = .24, ηp² = .02, they did indicate to a 
greater extent that their goal was to behave competently (M = 5.24, SD = 1.06) 
than did participants in the morality condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.30), F(1, 66) 
= 4.09, p = .047, ηp² = .06. Thus, in the morality condition, morality was 
indeed perceived to be more important than competence. Although in the 
competence condition competence goals were not seen as significantly more 
important than morality goals (which supports the notion that morality is 
overall of great importance to individuals; e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002), as 
intended— they were seen as more important than the competence goals in 
                                                 
8 Data collection took place in two separate waves. Due to blood pressure equipment failure 
during the first phase, a different blood pressure monitor was installed in our cardiovascular 
laboratory. For the first wave of participants, blood pressure was measured using a NIBP100a 
module (Biopac Systems Inc.,Goleta, CA). For the second wave of participants, blood pressure 
was measured using a Nexfin monitor (BMEYE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). To ensure the 
type of equipment did not affect our measures, we added this as a Factor in our design. Type of 
blood pressure equipment did not moderate the effect of Dimension on CV-responses (all Fs < 
1.01, ps > .3). 
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the morality condition. There were no differences between conditions in 
private collective self-esteem, F(1, 66) = 1.32, p = .25. 
As anticipated, participants in the morality condition were more inclined 
to think that their behavior would be perceived as stable by their fellow 
ingroup members (M = 4.68, SD = 1.09) than participants in the competence 
condition (M = 3.97, SD = 1.04), F(1, 66) = 7.66, p = .007, ηp² = .10. 
Perceptions of pervasiveness arguably undermine the perceived feasibility of 
changing the group’s impression of one’s behavior, thereby increasing the 
perceived (required) effort resulting in higher demand-appraisals after a 
negative morality evaluation compared to a negative competence evaluation. 
 
Cardiovascular reactivity  
We computed mean scores for HR, PEP, CO and TPR for the last minute of 
the baseline and the first minute of the speech task. We then computed 
reactivity scores (Kamarck et al., 1992) by subtracting the baseline scores from 
the speech task scores (see Table 3.1). For each reactivity score, we 
transformed outliers (i.e., raw scores more than 3 SDs from the mean) to the 




Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Reactivity as a function of Evaluative 
Dimension in Experiment 3.1 
 Morality Competence 
 M (SEM) M (SEM) 
Heart Rate 7.72 (1.69) 9.64 (1.72) 
Pre-Ejection Period -6.03 (3.62) -9.36 (2.92) 
Cardiac Output 0.07 (0.09) 0.33 (0.08) 






Task engagement. Overall, HR increased and PEP decreased significantly from 
zero, in both conditions, during the speech task, ts > 3.48, ps < .001, 
confirming sufficient overall task engagement and goal relevance. There were 
no differences between conditions in both HR and PEP (Fs < 1, ps > .44). 
 
Challenge and Threat. We calculated a single Threat – Challenge Index (i.e., TCI) 
using standardized z-scores of CO and TPR in the following formula: ZTPR * 
-1 + ZCO * 1 (e.g., Blascovich et al., 2004; Scheepers et al.,  2012; Seery et al., 
2010). Greater values indicate a relative tendency towards challenge, whereas 
lower values are indicative of a relative tendency towards threat. We analyzed 
TCI by means of an ANOVA with dimension as independent variable and 
included the baseline TCI values and PEP reactivity scores as covariates to 
control for differences in initial challenge and threat responses and 
engagement (e.g., Seery, Blascovich, Weisbuch, & Vick, 2004; Weisbuch-
Remington, Mendes, Seery, Blascovich, 2005). As predicted, participants in the 
morality condition were relatively more threatened (M = -0.72, SEM = 0.42) 
than participants in the competence condition, who were relatively more 
challenged (M = 0.35, SEM = 0.37), F(1, 37) = 4.17, p = 0.048, ηp² = .10 (see 
Figure 3.1). Thus, being reminded of one’s own behavior being evaluated as 
immoral by others in a group is relatively more threatening than one’s own 













































Figure 3.1  
Threat – Challenge Index as a function of evaluative dimension of own prior behavior in a 
group context, Experiment 3.1. Higher scores indicate a relative tendency towards challenge; 





Whereas in Experiment 3.1 participants were exposed to negative evaluations 
of own prior behavior in a group context, in Experiment 3.2 participants were 
exposed to evaluations of prior immoral or incompetent behavior of another 
ingroup member. In order to increase the salience of the lack of morality or 
competence displayed by another ingroup member, we enhanced the contrast 
between group members’ own behavior and the behavior of another group 
member. We did so by instructing group members to first recall a situation in 
which their own behavior was positively evaluated as moral or competent by 
others in a group context. Participants sent their behavioral description to 
others in the group via a chat circuit, and in turn received preprogrammed 
information allegedly indicating the behavioral descriptions provided by other 
group members. We varied the behavioral description of one of the ingroup 
members to convey that this group member had behaved in a way that was 
negatively evaluated as immoral or incompetent.   
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We assessed cardiovascular reactivity during the subsequent group task, 
and predicted that an ingroup member’s behavior indicating immorality would 
induce more threat than an ingroup member’s behavior indicating 
incompetence. In addition to measures of demand-appraisals (i.e., perceived 
stability of behavior) and collective self-esteem, in the second experiment we 
also assessed identification with the group to rule out the possibility that a 
negative (morality) evaluation of an ingroup member would lead participants 
to disengage from the group and the joint task.  
 
Method 
Participants and Design. Forty-nine undergraduate students (33 women, Mage = 
21.73 years, SD = 3.22) participated in this experiment. They received 6 Euros 
or course credits for participation. Using a 1-factor (Dimension: Morality vs. 
Competence) between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two experimental conditions. Participation took about 45 minutes. 
 
Procedure. The general procedure of the second experiment was similar to that 
of the first. Following the cover story of Experiment 3.1, we introduced the 
group task and assessed collective self-esteem and a pre-measure of group 
identification, as well as a baseline measure of cardiovascular responses. After 
participants (again referred to as “participant 2”) had provided descriptions of 
their own behavior that was positively evaluated as moral [competent] by others in 
a group context, they received preprogrammed behavioral descriptions of the 
others in their group. One of the group members (i.e., “participant 4”) 
allegedly had described immoral [incompetent] behavior, indicating being unable to 
recall an instance in which the group positively evaluated his/her moral or 
competent behavior and thus describing an instance in which s/he was 
confronted by others in the group with his/her immoral [incompetent] 
behavior.9 This served as our manipulation of the negative evaluation of an 
                                                 
9 The behavior was kept constant across conditions, but with different implications for the 
morality or competence of this ingroup member. The exact wording of the manipulation was as 
follows: “At my job as a member of a committee that organizes workshops, we also have to design 
flyers to promote the workshops. Designing the flyers always takes forever. One time I just went 
ahead and sent the flyer to the printer myself …” In the morality condition the manipulation 
continued with “… without consulting the other committee members. I now have 400 flyers, but I 
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ingroup member’s behavior in terms of morality or competence. Participants 
then completed a questionnaire measuring their identification with the group 
and the perceived stability of the behavior of participant 4. Next, they engaged 
in a speech task in which they presented their ideas about the role of morality 
[competence] in the upcoming group task, with the purpose of forming an 
impression of the others in the group and facilitating collaboration during the 
group task. This was the motivated performance situation that allowed us to 
assess cardiovascular indices of challenge and threat.  
 
Measures. As a check of the effectiveness of the dimension manipulation, 
participants indicated whether the focus of the group task was: A. moral or B. 
competent behavior. We measured private collective self-esteem (α = .88), group 
identification (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; four items; e.g., “I feel 
connected to the others in this group”; α = .92), and demand-appraisals in 
terms of stability of behavior (“I think participant 4 will display similar 
behavior in the future”). Similar to the procedure described in Experiment 3.1, 
we took continuous cardiovascular measures of HR, PEP, CO, and TPR 
throughout the experiment.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Four participants reported suspicion about the cover story and their data were 
therefore excluded from analyses. This resulted in a sample of 45 participants. 
Due to technical errors we lost physiological data of an additional two 
participants, leaving 43 participants with usable cardiovascular data.  
 
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful: In both conditions, 
100% of participants indicated the correct dimension as the focus of the group 
task, χ²(1, N = 43) = 43.00, p < .001. As anticipated, participants in the 
morality condition indicated that they perceived the behavior of participant 4 
to be somewhat more stable (M = 5.09, SD = 1.34) than participants in the 
competence condition (M = 4.45 SD = 1.18), F(1, 41) = 3.07, p = .09, ηp² = 
.07.  
                                                                                                       
have lost there trust.” In the competence condition the manipulation continued with “… without 
changing the date of the workshop. I now have 400 flyers, with the wrong date on it.” 
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A marginally significant effect of dimension emerged on collective self-
esteem, F(1, 41) = 3.59, p = .065, ηp² = .08; participants in the morality 
condition reported slightly higher private collective self-esteem (M = 5.71, SD 
= 1.11) than participants in the competence condition (M = 5.04, SD = 1.20). 
Including collective self-esteem as a covariate in the subsequent analyses did 
not alter the effect of dimension on our dependent measures, nor did it predict 
the dependent measures.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with time of measurement (Time 1 and 
Time 2) as within-subject variable and dimension as between-subject variable 
on identification revealed a main effect of time of measurement: Group 
identification increased after the alleged group interaction (Time 1: M = 3.31, 
SD = 1.46; Time 2: M = 4.48, SD = 1.34), F(1, 41) = 22.03, p < .001, ηp² = 
.35. The interaction between time of measurement and dimension was not 
significant, F(1, 41) = 1.60, p = .21, ηp² = .04. 
 
Cardiovascular reactivity.  
Task engagement. In both conditions, HR increased and PEP decreased 
significantly from zero during the speech task, ts > 2.78, ps < .01, confirming 
task engagement and goal relevance (see Table 3.2). There were no differences 
between conditions in both HR and PEP (Fs < 1, ps > .48).  
 
 
Table 3.2  
Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Reactivity as a function of Evaluative 
Dimension in Experiment 3.2 
 Morality Competence 
 M (SEM) M (SEM) 
Heart Rate 7.54 (1.50) 5.84 (1.84) 
Pre-Ejection Period -6.96 (1.99) -5.53 (1.99) 
Cardiac Output 0.15 (0.05) 0.19 (0.05) 
Total Peripheral Resistance 403.50 (255.74) -318.72 (249.82) 
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Challenge and threat. An ANOVA on the Threat – Challenge Index, again with 
dimension as independent variable and baseline TCI values and PEP reactivity 
scores as covariates, revealed, as predicted, that participants in the morality 
condition showed a relative tendency towards threat (M = -0.29, SEM = 0.29), 
whereas participants in the competence condition showed a relative tendency 
towards challenge (M = 0.37, SEM = 0.29), F(1, 39) = 4.94, p = 0.03, ηp² = .11 
















































Figure 3.2  
Threat – Challenge Index as a function of evaluative dimension of an ingroup member’s 
prior behavior, Experiment 3.2. Higher scores indicate a relative tendency towards challenge; 




Thus, the evaluation of an ingroup member’s behavior as immoral (vs. 
incompetent) induces a motivational state of threat rather than challenge in 
other group members. Considering the impact of morality on individuals’ self-
image and motivation (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Ellemers et al., 2008), a 
plausible response to the immorality of an ingroup member would be to 
disengage from the group task and disidentify with the group, especially when 
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group membership is relatively unimportant which can be the case with 
experimental groups like those created in the current study. Our data rule out 
this alternative explanation, as identification even increased during the course 
of the experiment (see also Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), and private 
collective self-esteem was slightly raised in the morality condition. In addition, 
there were no differences between conditions in cardiovascular reactivity 
indicative of task engagement (increased HR, decreased PEP). Thus, 
participants remained attached to the group and engaged in the task when 
morality was made salient, even though collaborating with an ingroup member 
who previously displayed immoral behavior was motivationally threatening 
rather than challenging for them.   
 
General Discussion 
In two experiments we investigated how negative intragroup morality vs. 
competence evaluations affect the motivational states of individual group 
members. In Experiment 3.1, we demonstrated that own prior behavior 
evaluated as immoral (as compared to incompetent) by others in a group 
context is perceived as more pervasive (i.e., stable) and induces a relative state 
of threat rather than challenge. We found similar effects for negative 
evaluations of another ingroup member’s behavior. In Experiment 3.2, 
another ingroup member’s behavior evaluated as immoral (vs. incompetent) 
elicited a relative threat rather than challenge response in group members.  
These results extend prior work and are in line with a social identity 
perspective on morality that argues for a group-based analysis of how morality 
regulates social behavior (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). The current data 
support the notion that the relevance of morality judgments stems from their 
implications for group inclusion and acceptance (Leach et al., 2013). Extending 
previous research that revealed the impact of morality vs. competence ingroup 
norms on behavioral choices (e.g., Ellemers et al., 2008), we assessed how 
morality judgments of individual behavior in an intragroup setting induce 
specific motivational states. The present results support the notion that 
morality is of particular importance to group members. That is, in Experiment 
3.2 we demonstrated how the behavior of someone important for one’s 
identity (i.e., an ingroup member) affects the motivational state of the self as a 
group member. If the threat elicited by the mere presence of immoral ingroup 
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members would impact on personal identity concerns, this should have 
decreased the willingness to identify with the group, as a way to dissociate the 
self from the immoral individual. However, group identification was retained 
and improved, even when the presence of an immoral ingroup member 
constituted a source of threat. Future research might further distinguish 
between the different sources of identity threat, by comparing responses to the 
behavior of ingroup members to responses to the behavior of other 
individuals in an interpersonal context, or to responses to the behavior of 
outgroup members in an intergroup context.  
By examining the cardiovascular indices of motivational states, the 
current research also provides further insight in the psychophysiological 
processes elicited by morality judgments. Both studies showed that reminders 
of immorality (vs. incompetence) in a group context are threatening rather 
than challenging, indicating that morality increases the salience of situational 
demands to the extent that they outweigh available resources. This notion is 
further supported by our observation that group members perceive immoral 
behavior to be more pervasive than incompetent behavior. The more 
pervasive the focal behavior is perceived to be, the more effort is needed to 
change other people’s judgments, thereby increasing the situational demands. 
This has implications for the behavioral choices of group members and 
outcomes for the group. When group members experience threat rather than 
challenge, they become more rigid in their joint decision making (De Wit et al., 
2012), implying that they tend to hold on to their initial viewpoints. 
Evaluations of immoral (vs. incompetent) behavior, which induce a state of 
threat rather than challenge, may consequently be less efficient in eliciting 
behavioral change, because threat tends to impede rather than foster attitudinal 
or behavioral adjustments.  
Group members critically evaluate the behavior of their fellow ingroup 
members in an attempt to elicit desirable behaviors that reaffirm the positive 
social identity (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994). From the perspective of the 
group it might intuitively seem most effective to negatively evaluate their 
group members’ behavior in terms of morality rather than competence in 
order to foster behavioral change. Considering the importance of morality for 
the individual (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) and group members’ motivation to 
adhere to moral (vs. competence) norms (Ellemers et al., 2008), this seems 
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highly plausible. Yet, as we have argued and shown in the current research, 
communicating moral disapproval of the behavior of individual group 
members might actually be a counter-efficient strategy to achieve behavioral 
change. Indeed, negative evaluations of group members’ behavior in terms of 
morality (vs. competence) elicit a motivational state of threat rather than 
challenge. Moral disapproval thus does not provide an easy tool for a group to 
shape the behavior of its members. When the aim is to motivate group 
members towards behavioral change, using moral disapproval might backfire 

























This chapter is based on Van der Lee, R., Ellemers, N., & Scheepers, D. 
(2013). Who gets to join the club? Responses to prospective group members 





Applying for a new job, enrolling at university, and moving to a new country 
are all examples involving an individual who seeks to join a new group, be it a 
company, school, or country. In all these cases, the individual is a prospective 
group member. Before being included or accepted by the group, prospective 
group members are often subjected to a selection procedure (i.e., assessments, 
background checks). Since groups are motivated to maintain a positive social 
identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), they evaluate the extent to which individuals 
seek inclusion and meet the group’s standards (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013; Levine 
& Moreland, 1994). That is, groups evaluate the extent to which prospective 
members might contribute to or harm the group’s positive social identity. As a 
consequence, prospective group members run the risk of being excluded or 
prevented from becoming a full member (e.g., not being hired, not being 
admitted, green card application being disapproved).  
In the current research, we examine when and why prospective group 
members might be excluded from group membership. Specifically, we propose 
that group members’ responses to prospective group members depend on how 
they can contribute to the group in terms of its standards of two central 
dimensions of social judgments, namely morality and competence (e.g., Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Leach, Ellemers, Barreto, 2007). Considering the 
importance of morality for individuals’ and groups’ identity (e.g., Aquino & 
Reed, 2002; Leach et al., 2007), we argue that responses to a prospective group 
member are particularly affected by the individual’s morality. As will be 
outlined in more detail below, we propose that individuals who lack morality 
pose a threat to the positive social identity, and are therefore more likely to be 
excluded from the group than individuals whose competence does not meet 
the group’s standards. Conversely, individuals who can contribute to the 
group’s morality are more likely to be included and accepted as new group 
members than highly competent individuals who might “outsmart” others in 
the group. In three experiments, we aim to examine the validity of this 
reasoning and shed light on the predominant role of morality in the evaluation 
of and responses to prospective group members.   
 
Morality vs. competence as sources for a positive social identity 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people strive 
towards a positive social identity, because they derive part of their self-esteem 
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from their group memberships. In principle, any domain can be used to 
establish a positive social identity. Up until recently, competence has been 
considered the primary dimension that determines the group’s status in terms 
of success, both in outcomes and in resources (e.g., Bettencourt, Dorr, 
Charlton, Hume, 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Fiske et al., 2002; Judd, James-
Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005). However, more recent work revealed 
that morality, rather than competence, may actually be the more important 
dimension for a positive evaluation of an ingroup (e.g., Leach et al., 2007). For 
instance, group members are likely to adhere to the moral norms of the group 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008) since they anticipate gaining more 
ingroup respect by doing so than from adherence to the group’s competence 
norms (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011). Accordingly, in a field experiment 
among school teachers, the perceived morality of a prospective new manager, 
rather than his or her competence, was the primary determinant of group 
members’ willingness to help the new manager adjust (Pagliaro, Brambilla, 
Sacchi, D’Angelo, & Ellemers, 2013).  
Morality thus appears to be an important dimension for evaluations of 
the group as well as for its members, and has a particular potential to 
contribute to a positive social identity. When morality is lacking, however, this 
raises a potential threat to the positive social identity of the group. Indeed, 
information suggesting a lack of morality is considered to be highly diagnostic 
of individual dispositions and predictive of future behavior (Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987). When the self is evaluated by the group as lacking in morality, 
this has a negative impact on individuals’ affective responses and perceived 
coping abilities in their striving towards becoming a moral group member (Van 
der Lee, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012a). Similar threat experiences are induced 
when another group member is seen as lacking morality, while this is less likely 
when another group member lacks competence (Van der Lee, Ellemers, & 
Scheepers, 2012b). In sum, we argue that individuals displaying high morality 
have more potential to contribute to the group’s positive social identity than 
highly competent individuals. Conversely, individuals showing a lack of 
morality pose a greater threat to the group’s positive social identity than 
individuals who lack competence. Thus, we predict that the morality of 
prospective group members elicits more pronounced acceptance versus 
exclusion responses from the group than their competence. 
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Responses to prospective group members 
As explained above, group members strive to achieve and are motivated to 
maintain a positive social identity of their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In 
doing so, group members evaluate the extent to which group members can 
contribute to the group’s goals and norms (Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 
1982). This evaluation process is particularly relevant for individuals seeking 
inclusion in the group, as it provides the group with information about a 
potential contribution or threat to the positive social identity of the group 
(Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). The group’s judgment of a prospective group 
member, reflected in the outcome of the evaluation process, should thus 
determine the group’s responses towards him or her. When it seems that the 
prospective group member can contribute to the group’s positive social 
identity, the group will tend to accept the individual, and show a willingness to 
socialize him or her by teaching appropriate behaviors and attitudes (Moreland 
& Levine, 1982). When, however, the prospective group member does not 
seem to contribute to the group’s image or even threatens it, the individual is 
likely to elicit negative emotional and behavioral responses, conveying 
derogation and social exclusion (e.g., Marques & Paez, 1994; Moreland & 
Levine, 1982; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010; Williams, Forgas, & 
Von Hippel, 2005). 
As indicated above, group members are generally inclined to evaluate 
prospective group members primarily on the domain of competence, especially 
when task performance is relevant (e.g., in educational or work settings). This 
is reflected in research in this domain to date. Such competence evaluations 
usually contain an assessment of—attitudes towards—success, for instance 
when the individual is seen to undermine the group’s success (Abrams, 
Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Pinto et al., 2010) or underperforms 
compared to the other group members (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). In some 
studies, the domain of evaluation is ambiguous, for instance when an 
individual displays deviant personality traits (e.g., Abrams et al., 2000; Frings, 
Hurst, Cleveland, Blascovich, & Abrams, 2012; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 
2001).  
Besides a focus on competence evaluations, the majority of studies 
investigating intragroup evaluations have focused on the impact of, and 
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responses to, group members who threaten the group’s image because they 
could not live up to the group’s performance expectations (i.e., negative 
deviants; the Black Sheep Effect; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Some 
studies, however, also explored the impact of, and responses to, group 
members who are superior to the other group members (i.e., positive deviants; 
e.g., Abrams et al., 2000). To the extent that they deviate from what is typical 
for the group, individuals who are superior to other group members might—
just like inferior individuals—challenge the group’s cohesiveness in terms of 
shared standards among its members (Brown, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Indeed, it has been argued that groups may also desire to 
exclude group members who positively deviate from the group because they 
reveal that other group members may be deficient or implicitly condemn the 
group’s standards (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008; Parks & Stone, 2010). In 
general, however, a superior individual has the potential to enhance the 
group’s identity, because the positive evaluation of the individual might reflect 
positively on the evaluation of the group as a whole (Schmitt, Silvia, & 
Branscombe, 2000). Consequently, individuals who are superior to others in 
the group are often liked and praised (Hogg & Hardie, 1991).   
Thus, whereas these recent studies have examined the different directions 
in which individuals can distinguish themselves from the group—i.e., through 
inferiority vs. superiority (e.g., Pinto et al., 2010), research to date has not 
systematically compared the impact of different evaluation dimensions on 
responses towards prospective group members. Because morality seems to be 
more important than competence for a positive social identity of the group 
(e.g., Leach et al., 2007), we propose that responses to prospective group 
members depend on the dimension of the evaluation. Specifically, we argue that 
positive or negative evaluations on the moral dimension elicit more 
pronounced responses from the group than positive or negative evaluations on 
the dimension of competence.  
 
The current research 
In the current research, we compare the group’s responses to evaluations of 
prospective group members in the domain of competence with their responses 
to evaluations in the domain of morality. The central hypothesis is that 
morality evaluations of prospective group members elicit more pronounced 
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responses from the group than evaluations of competence. Deficient morality 
is perceived as highly diagnostic of the individual and predictive of future 
behavior (Martijn, Spears, Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Skowronski & 
Carlston, 1987). We therefore predict that individuals who lack morality pose a 
threat to the positive social identity of the group, and consequently elicit 
negative responses such as derogation and are more likely to be excluded from 
group membership than individuals who lack competence. Conversely, 
because individuals who are morally superior have the potential to enhance the 
group’s moral image, we anticipate that individuals who excel in morality 
arouse positive responses and are more likely to be accepted as new group 
members than individuals who excel in competence.  
We examined these predictions in three experiments. In Experiment 4.1, 
we investigate responses towards prospective group members lacking morality 
or competence. In Experiment 4.2, we focus on responses towards prospective 
group members who are superior to the group in terms of morality or 
competence. Experiment 4.3 addresses responses to positive as well as 
negative evaluations of prospective group members in terms of morality and 
competence. In all three experiments, we assess responses towards prospective 
group members by examining group members’ willingness to exclude or to 
socialize the prospective group members, and capture actual exclusion 
behavior. In addition to measuring (behavioral) responses to the prospective 
group member, we also measure how these individuals are perceived in the 
first place. More specifically, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, we examine the 
perceived fit of the prospective group member with the group; in Experiment 
4.3, the prospective group member was explicitly rated on specific traits 
(arrogance, trustworthiness). Finally, in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, we examine 
the extent to which the prospective group member arouses social identity 
threat, while in Experiment 4.3 we check how evaluations of the prospective 
group member impact on the position and motivation of other group 
members. Thus, in three experiments we examine group members’ responses 
towards prospective group members who either lack or excel in terms of 







Prospective group members lacking morality vs. competence 
Participants in this experiment engaged with other (fictitious) participants in a 
collaborative task for which morality or competence—depending on 
condition—was said to be the main dimension of performance. In order to 
enhance a sense of common group value, we gave participants bogus feedback 
suggesting that the group members attach average and similar value to either 
morality or competence. By affirming group members’ own prototypicality in 
terms of morality or competence, we strove to minimize their attention to and 
concern about their own position in the group. Next, while preparing for the 
collaborative task a prospective group member was introduced, who was said 
to attach less value to either morality or competence than the other group 
members. The prospective group member thus appeared to lack morality or 
competence compared to the group. We then assessed participants’ 
perceptions of and responses towards the prospective group member. We 
predicted that an individual who attached little value to morality would arouse 
more social identity threat, and would consequently be more likely to be 
excluded from the group than an individual who attached little value to 
competence. Because an individual lacking morality is argued to pose a greater 
threat to the group’s positive identity than an individual lacking competence, 
we also predicted that group members would perceive less fit (i.e., more 




Participants and Design. Ninety-seven undergraduate students (92 women, Mage = 
19.38 years, SD = 3.04) participated in this experiment. They received three 
Euros or course credits for participation. Using a 1-factor (Dimension: 
Immoral vs. Incompetent) between-subjects design, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions. Participation 
took approximately 30 minutes. 
 
Procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory and were seated in separate 
cubicles. The cover story indicated that the experimental session consisted of 
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three separate studies. The first was said to be about validating personality 
measures, the second about attitude formation, and the third about 
cooperation. In reality, the first study consisted of a bogus questionnaire later 
to be used to induce the manipulation, the second was an unrelated filler task, 
and the third contained the actual study. When starting the third study, 
participants—who were all referred to as “participant B”—were told that, 
since this study was about cooperation, they would be collaborating in a group 
with several other participants on a management dilemma task. At this point, 
two other (fictitious) participants—i.e., participants “A” and “C”—were also 
said to be ready to start the collaboration task.  
The task involved solving dilemmas which often require a trade-off 
between moral and competent considerations. Participants were specifically 
asked to focus on either the moral or competent considerations, depending on 
the experimental condition. In order to enhance the collaboration, participants 
first received background information about their group members’ morality 
[competence]. At this point, participants were told that the questions that they 
answered in “Study 1” of this experimental session, supposedly to validate 
personality measures, actually measured the value people attach to either 
morality (i.e., honesty, trustworthiness) or competence (i.e., skills, intelligence). 
Allegedly based on their answers and reaction times, participants were 
furthermore told that we computed a score indicating the extent to which they 
value morality [competence]. A graph was shown that displayed the value 
participants and their group members attached to morality [competence]. Below 
the graph, the explicit conclusion was drawn that “on morality [competence] you 
score similar to your group members and you attach average value to morality 
[competence]. You are equally inclined to choose moral [competent] solutions and 
show moral [competent] behavior as your group members”.   
Next, participants were given several example dilemmas to solve 
individually with the purpose of preparing them for the collaboration task. 
During this practice round, a popup screen appeared on participants’ 
computer screen informing them about a fourth (fictitious) participant—i.e., 
“participant D”—being ready to join their group. However, since participants 
were already in a group and received information about each other, they and 
their group members would first have the opportunity to discuss whether or 
not they wanted participant D to join their group for the collaboration task. In 
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order to do so, they would receive participant’s D score on morality [competence], 
and then be presented with several questions which would help them to 
structure their thoughts about participant D.  
To induce the manipulation, we again showed the graph which now also 
included the value that participant D attached to either morality or 
competence. Below the graph it was explicitly described that “participant D 
scores lower on morality [competence] than the other group members. S/he 
attaches less, and below average, value to morality [competence]. Participant D is 
therefore less inclined to choose moral [competent] solutions and to show moral 
[competent] behavior than the other group members”. Participants were then 
presented with a questionnaire which comprised the dependent measures. 
After completion, a chat-service popped-up in which group members A, B and 
C could communicate and discuss the position of participant D. Participants 
were, ostensibly randomly, selected to be the first to sent a message to the 
other group members about whether and why they thought participant D 
could or could not join the group for the collaboration task. When participants 
had sent their message, they were told they had reached the end of the study. 
All participants were then fully debriefed, paid and thanked for their 
participation.   
 
Measures  
Unless reported otherwise, all items were presented on 7-point scales (1 = 
completely disagree to 7 = completely agree).  
 
Checks. To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants indicated 
the extent to which they perceived the prospective group member to be moral 
(3 items: “reliable”, “sincere” and “honest”, α = .93) and competent (3 items: 
“intelligent”, “competent” and “skilled”, α = .76; Leach et al., 2007). We also 
measured group identification and collective self-esteem to assess the extent to 
which the experimental groups were relevant to participants. Group 
identification was measured with four items (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1999; e.g., “I felt connected to the others in this group”; α = .78). Private 
collective self-esteem was also measured with 4 items (Luhtanen & Crocker, 




Perception of the prospective group member. We used a measure of intragroup 
differentiation (Marques et al., 1998) to assess how similar or different 
participants perceived the prospective group member to be from the group (1 
= very similar to 9 = very different).  
 
Social identity threat. Participants indicated the extent to which they perceived 
the prospective group member to be e.g., “threatening”, “offending”, 
“damaging” (8 items; α = .94) to the group as a measure of social identity 
threat.  
 
Responses towards the prospective group member. The tendency to exclude the 
prospective group member from the group was measured with eight items 
(e.g., “I do not want participant D to join this group”, α = .92). Additionally, 
we included socializing responses towards the prospective group member 
(Pinto et al., 2010; e.g., “I will try to convince D to change the value s/he 
attaches to morality [competence], α = .83).10  
 
Exclusion-behavior. Via the chat-circuit, participants were asked to write a 
message to their group members stating whether and why they wanted to 
include or exclude the prospective group member from the collaboration task. 
We coded the statements on whether or not they communicated exclusion (1 
= inclusion, 2 = exclusion) as a behavioral measure of exclusion.  
 
Results 
The data of ten participants were removed from all analyses due to expressed 
suspicion about the cover story, resulting in data of 87 participants in the final 
analyses. Unless reported otherwise all data were analyzed by means of 
Analyses of Variance with dimension as independent variable.  
 
                                                 
10 To confirm that the tendency to exclude and to socialize a prospective group member can be 
considered two separate response tendencies, we conducted a principal component analysis, using 
varimax rotation, on the 14 items. The analysis yielded a 2-component solution, which factor 
loadings explained 64.51% of the total variance. Eigenvalues were 5.75 for the first component 
(i.e., tendency to exclude) and 3.28 for the second component (i.e., tendency to socialize), thereby 
confirming the distinction between exclusion and socializing tendencies as responses towards 
prospective group members. 
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Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful: Participants in the 
immoral condition indicated that they perceived the prospective group 
member to be less moral (M = 3.63, SD = 1.07) than participants in the 
incompetent condition (M = 5.25, SD = 0.93), F(1, 85) = 56.95, p < .001, ηp² 
= .40. Moreover, participants in the incompetent condition indicated to 
perceive the prospective group member to be less competent (M = 4.10, SD = 
0.68) than participants in the immoral condition (M = 5.00, SD = 0.69), F(1, 
85) = 37.21, p < .001, ηp² = .30.  
For private collective self-esteem, a significant effect of dimension 
emerged, F(1, 85) = 9.98, p = .002, ηp² = .10. Participants in the immoral 
condition reported more private collective self-esteem (M = 5.39, SD = 0.78) 
than participants in the incompetent condition (M = 4.89, SD = 0.72), 
suggesting that individuals feel better about their group when it is a moral 
group rather than when it is a competent group. We found no differences in 
group identification (F < 1, p = .63) between the experimental conditions. 
 
Perception of the prospective group member. Participants perceived more differences 
between the prospective group member who lacked morality and the group (M 
= 6.56, SD = 1.52) than between the prospective group member who lacked 
competence and the group (M = 5.61, SD = 1.26), F(1, 85) = 9.99, p = .002, η-
p² = .10.  
 
Social identity threat. As predicted, the prospective group member who lacked 
morality induced more social identity threat (M = 3.13, SD = 1.14) than the 
prospective group member who lacked competence (M = 2.48, SD = 1.06), 
F(1, 85) = 7.55, p = .01, ηp² = .08. 
 
Responses to the prospective group member. Participants were more inclined to 
exclude the prospective group member who lacked morality (M = 3.48, SD = 
1.38) than the prospective group member who lacked competence (M = 2.79, 
SD = 1.19), F(1, 85) = 6.26, p = .01, ηp² = .07. We found no differences 





Mediation. To examine whether the effect of dimension on the tendency to 
exclude the prospective group member was mediated by social identity threat, 
we conducted bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), using the 
SPSS macro for simple mediation with 5000 bootstrap resamples. The 
tendency towards exclusion was entered as dependent variable, with dimension 
as predictor and social identity threat as mediator.  
The bootstrap results showed that the indirect effect of dimension on the 
tendency towards exclusion through social identity threat was significant with a 
point estimate of .56 and a 95% BCa CI of 0.1481 to 0.9894, indicating full 
mediation (see Figure 4.1). The prospective group member lacking morality 
(vs. competence) elicited more social identity threat, which led to a greater 















Figure 4.1  
Social identity threat mediates the relationship between the evaluation of the prospective group 
member and the tendency to exclude the prospective group member, Experiment 4.1; *p < 
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Exclusion-behavior. Five participants failed to make a statement about including 
or excluding the prospective group member in the task, resulting in 82 
participants with behavioral data. We found no differences between conditions 
for exclusion-behavior, χ²(1, N = 82) = 0.01, p = .94. Overall, statements 
explicitly conveying exclusion were rare. In the immoral condition, 9.5% of 
participants communicated exclusion of the prospective group member, 
compared to 10.0% of participants in the incompetent condition. Exclusion-
behavior was not correlated with the tendency to exclude the prospective 
group member, r = .05, ns. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, we examined how groups respond to prospective group 
members with a moral vs. competent deficiency. As predicted, we 
demonstrated that a prospective group member who lacks morality elicits 
more social identity threat and is therefore more likely to be excluded than a 
prospective group member who lacks competence. These results confirm the 
importance of morality for groups and individual group members (e.g., Aquino 
& Reed, 2002; Leach et al., 2007), and the perceived diagnosticity of 
information indicating a lack of morality for the overall assessment of the 
individual (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). That is, the lack of morality of a 
prospective group member is likely to be perceived as a relatively 
unchangeable characteristic of the individual, and poses therefore a greater 
threat to the positive social identity than a less diagnostic prospective group 
member who lacks competence. In turn, this threat causes group members to 
respond more harshly towards the prospective group member lacking morality, 
as the mediation on the tendency to socially exclude the prospective group 
member shows. However, the behavioral measure we used—which consisted 
of written statements—revealed that participants rarely suggested that an 
inferior prospective group member should be excluded from the group, even 
though they did indicate on rating scales that this was what they preferred. 
Apparently, participants were reluctant to actually take the initiative to propose 
exclusion in a written statement, possibly because they perceived such a 
deliberate message (Hamilton & Mineo, 1998)—for which they could be held 
accountable—as unwarranted, given the context. 
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As we argued before, the importance of morality for a positive social 
identity of the group should not only result in more pronounced responses 
towards prospective group members who lack morality, but also towards 
prospective group members who excel in terms of morality. Whereas 
prospective group members lacking morality pose a threat to the positive 
social identity, we argue that highly moral prospective group members have 
the potential to enhance the positive social identity of the group. We therefore 
predict that a highly moral prospective group member is more likely to be 
included in the group than a highly competent prospective group member. We 
tested this prediction in the second experiment.  
 
Experiment 4.2: 
Prospective group members excelling in morality vs. competence 
In this experiment, participants were confronted with a prospective group 
member who allegedly attached more value to morality or competence than the 
other group members (i.e., a highly moral or competent prospective group 
member). We again assessed participants’ perceptions of, and responses 
towards, the prospective group member. We predicted that a highly moral 
prospective group member would induce less social identity threat, and would 
consequently be more likely to be included in the group than a highly 
competent prospective group member. In addition, we predicted that group 
members would perceive better fit (i.e., more similarities) between the group 
and a highly moral rather than competent individual.  
 
Method 
Participants & Design. Fifty-three undergraduate students (39 women, Mage = 
21.57, SD = 4.17) participated in this experiment in return for three Euros or 
course credits. Using a 1-Factor (Dimension: Moral vs. Competent) between-
subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions. 
 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 4.1, except for the 
direction of the manipulation. Participants were told that the prospective 
group member, participant D, scored higher on morality [competence] than the 
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other group members, and attached more, and above average, value to morality 
[competence]. Participant D was thus more inclined to choose moral [competent] 
solutions and to show moral [competent] behavior than the other group members. 
After the manipulation, the questionnaire comprising the dependent measures 
followed.  
 
Measures. The questionnaire comprised similar measures and items as in 
Experiment 4.1. The checks consisted of a manipulation check of the 
prospective group member’s perceived morality (α = .93) and competence (α 
= .77), group identification (α = .82), and private collective self-esteem (α = 
.72). Perceptions of the prospective group member were again assessed by 
means of perceived fit of the prospective group member with the group (1 = 
very different to 9 = very similar). We then measured social identity threat (α = .91) 
and the tendency to exclude (α = .96) and to socialize (α = .85) the prospective 




Due to expressed suspicion about the cover story, we removed data of four 
participants from all analyses, resulting in usable data of 49 participants. 
 
Checks. The manipulation of dimension was successful: Participants in the 
moral condition perceived the prospective group member to be more moral 
(M = 5.67, SD = 0.89) than participants in the competent condition (M = 3.16, 
SD = 0.90), F(1, 47) = 95.52, p < .001, ηp² = .67. Moreover, participants in the 
competent condition perceived the prospective group member to be more 
competent (M = 5.53, SD = 0.69) than participants in the moral condition (M 
= 4.22, SD = 0.71), F(1, 47) = 42.75, p < .001, ηp² = .48.  
Differences between conditions also emerged for group identification, 
F(1, 47) = 7.38, p = .01, ηp² = .14. Participants in the moral condition 
                                                 
11 A principal component analysis, using varimax rotation, confirmed the distinction between the 
tendency to exclude and to socialize a prospective group member. The analysis yielded a 2-
component solution. The items explained 74.57% of the total variance, and Eigenvalues were 6.21 
for the first component (i.e., tendency to exclude) and 3.48 for the second component (i.e., 
tendency to socialize).  
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identified more with the group (M = 5.53, SD = 0.69) than participants in the 
competent condition (M = 5.53, SD = 0.69). For private collective self-esteem, 
we found a marginally significant difference between conditions, F(1, 47) = 
3.83, p = .06, ηp² = .07. Participants in the moral condition reported slightly 
more private collective self-esteem (M = 5.37, SD = 0.76) than participants in 
the competent condition (M = 4.91, SD = 0.89), in keeping with previous 
research showing that individuals feel better when they belong to a moral 
group rather than when they belong to a competent group.  
 
Perception of the prospective group member. Participants perceived more similarities 
between the highly moral prospective group member and the group (M = 4.77, 
SD = 1.63) than between the highly competent prospective group member and 
the group (M = 3.83, SD = 1.37), F(1, 47) = 4.73, p = .03, ηp² = .09.  
 
Social identity threat. As predicted, a highly moral prospective group member 
elicited less social identity threat (M = 2.35, SD = 0.82) than a highly 
competent prospective group member (M = 3.06, SD = 1.28), F(1, 47) = 5.51, 
p = .02, ηp² = .10. 
 
Responses to the prospective group member. Participants reported to be less inclined 
to exclude a highly moral prospective group member (M = 2.64, SD = 1.43) 
than a highly competent prospective group member (M = 3.53, SD = 1.69), 
F(1, 47) = 3.99, p = .05, ηp² = .08. We found no differences between 
conditions in socializing responses, F(1, 47) = 0.12, p = .73, ηp² = .003. 
 
Mediation. As in Experiment 4.1, we conducted bootstrapping analyses 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004), with the tendency to exclude the prospective group 
member as dependent variable, dimension as predictor, and social identity 
threat as mediator. The bootstrap results showed that the indirect effect of 
dimension on the tendency to exclude the prospective group member through 
social identity threat was significant with a point estimate of -.69 and a 95% 
BCa CI of -1.4345 to -0.1053, indicating full mediation (see Figure 4.2). A 
highly moral (vs. competent) prospective group member induced less social 
identity threat, which led to a decreased tendency to exclude the highly moral, 














Figure 4.2  
Social identity threat mediates the relationship between the evaluation of the prospective group 
member and the tendency to exclude the prospective group member, Experiment 4.2; *p < 




Exclusion-behavior. One participant did not write a message, resulting in 48 
participants with behavioral data. We found no reliable differences between 
conditions in exclusion-behavior, χ²(1, N = 48) = 2.47, p = .12. In the moral 
condition, 12% of participants communicated to exclude the prospective 
group member, compared to 30.4% of participants in the competent 
condition. Exclusion-behavior was significantly correlated with the tendency to 
exclude the prospective group member, r = .88, p < .001. 
 
Discussion 
As predicted, results confirmed that a prospective group member who excels 
in terms of morality is evaluated more positively, and elicits less social identity 
threat than a prospective group member who excels in terms of competence. 
As a consequence, group members are more inclined to accept and include a 
highly moral individual in the group than a highly competent individual. We 
reasoned that this is the case because highly moral individuals have the 
potential to contribute substantially to the positive social identity of the group. 
That is, morality is seen as more central and more important for the group’s 
positive image than competence (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Leach et al., 2007). An 
individual who has the potential to contribute to or enhance the group’s 
.97** -.71* 
Prospective group member: 
1 = competent 
2 = moral 
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morality is therefore more likely to be accepted by the group than an individual 
who outsmarts the group in terms of competence. Again, as found in 
Experiment 4.1, group members did not differ in the extent to which they 
proposed to exclude a highly moral and competent prospective group 
member. However, the observed pattern of exclusion behavior is in line with 
our prediction that group members are keener to include an individual who 
excels in terms or morality rather than competence.  
 
Experiment 4.3: 
The morality vs. competence of prospective group members 
The aim of Experiment 4.3 was to replicate and extend the findings of 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 by examining responses towards prospective group 
members who either lack or excel in terms of morality or competence in a 
single design. We systematically varied the dimension (morality vs. 
competence) and direction (positive vs. negative) of the prospective group 
member’s evaluation and examined perceptions of and responses towards the 
prospective group member. We included several additional measures in order 
to gain further insight in the impact of prospective group members on the 
group’s responses. First, we assessed specific perceptions of prospective group 
members in terms of their perceived arrogance and trustworthiness, because 
these traits are relevant for interacting and cooperating with others who are 
either inferior or superior to the group. Second, we assessed whether 
prospective group members also affect group members’ evaluation of their 
own membership and position in the group. Third, while in the first two 
experiments we measured exclusion behavior via chat messages; in the current 
experiment we measured exclusion behavior by means of video messages. 
Considering that written statements communicating exclusion were generally 
rare in the chat messages, we used a different behavioral measure in this 
experiment. That is, we included a speech task (by means of video messages), 
because spoken messages are arguably more ephemeral, or volatile, than 
sending written statements (Hamilton & Mineo, 1998), and might therefore 
more easily facilitate the communication of a negative message, such as one 
containing social exclusion.  
As a final addition to the dependent variable side of our design, in the 
third experiment we also included cardiovascular measures of challenge and 
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threat to examine whether the evaluation of the prospective group member 
might impact upon group members’ psychophysiological stress and coping 
responses. According to the biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat 
(BPSM; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), motivational states can range from 
“threat” to “challenge” on a bipolar continuum. These motivational states 
result from demand- (i.e., uncertainty, required effort) and resource- (i.e., 
knowledge, skills) appraisals in motivated performance situations. When 
situational demands outweigh individual resources, a state of threat emerges. 
Conversely, when individual resources match or outweigh situational demands 
a state of challenge emerges. These motivational states are in turn indicated by 
specific patterns of cardiovascular reactivity. In order to distinguish between 
challenge and threat, task engagement and goal relevance—as indicated by 
increased heart rate (HR) and decreased pre-ejection period (PEP; an index of 
left ventricular contractile force)—are required. Next, cardiac output (CO; the 
amount of blood in liters that is pumped through the heart per minute) and 
total peripheral resistance (TPR; the constriction vs. dilation of blood flow 
through the arterial system) distinguish between challenge and threat: 
Challenge is marked by relatively high CO and low TPR, whereas threat is 
marked by relatively low CO and high TPR. These measures can gain insight in 
group members’ psychophysiological stress and coping responses to 




Participants and Design. One-hundred and nine undergraduate students (78 
women, Mage = 25.06 years, SD = 8.13) participated and received either 6 
Euros or course credits for participation. We employed a 2(Dimension: 
Morality vs. Competence) X 2(Direction: Positive vs. Negative) between-
subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
experimental conditions. Participation took approximately 45 minutes. 
Procedure. Participants arrived in the laboratory, were seated in front of a 
computer equipped with a webcam, and attached to the apparatus for 
measuring cardiovascular responses (see below). To measure 
electrocardiographic (EKG) and impedance cardiographic (ICG) signals, four 
spot electrodes were placed on participants’ upper and lower back and two on 
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their chest. In addition, a blood pressure sensor was attached to the index 
finger of their non-dominant hand. We took a 5-minute baseline measure of 
their cardiovascular responses.  
We then continued with explaining the general procedure and cover 
story, which were similar to that of the first and second experiment. 
Participant D, i.e., the prospective group member, was introduced as attaching 
less [more] value to morality [competence] than the other group members, 
depending on condition. Participants then completed a questionnaire, after 
which they engaged in a speech task. They delivered a speech in front of a 
webcam about whether and why they (did not) wanted participant D to join 
the group for the collaboration task. The speeches recorded by each group 
member would allegedly be shown to the others in the group, with the purpose 
of discussing whether and why participant D could or could not join the group 
for the collaboration task. Participants were (ostensibly randomly) chosen to 
record their speech first. They could take up to three minutes for their speech, 
during which we assessed their cardiovascular responses (e.g., Mendes, 
Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007). When participants finished their 
speech, they reached the end of the study and were debriefed, paid, and 
thanked for their participation.  
 
Measures 
All dependent variables were measured on 7-point scales (1 = completely disagree 
to 7 = completely agree) and comprised exact similar items as used in the first two 
experiments, unless reported otherwise.  
 
Checks. As a check of the effectiveness of our manipulations, we asked 
participants to indicate the prospective group member’s perceived morality (α 
= .95) and competence (α = .88). Additionally, we again assessed group 
identification (α = .81), and private collective self-esteem (α = .74). 
 
Perception of the prospective group member. To gain more insight in participants’ 
perceptions of the prospective group member, we assessed their trust in the 
prospective group member and the perceived arrogance of the prospective 
group member. Trust was measured with five items adapted from The Specific 
Interpersonal Trust Scale (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; e.g., “If we decided 
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to meet somewhere, I would be certain that participant D would be there”, α = 
.89). Perceived arrogance was measured with 4 items (e.g., “I think participant 
D looks down on the other group members”; α = .80).12  
Evaluation of own membership. To assess participants’ evaluations of the impact of 
the prospective group member on their own group membership, we asked 
participants to indicate the extent to which they were concerned about their 
own position in the group (5 items; e.g., “Because of participant D’s values, I 
am worried about my own position in the group”; α = .86). 
 
Responses to the prospective group member. The tendencies to exclude (α = .87) and 
to socialize (α = .75) the prospective group member were again assessed. As an 
additional response, we included a measure of approach tendencies towards 
the prospective group member (4 items; e.g., “I would like to stay in touch 
with participant D”; α = .85).13 
Exclusion-behavior. We coded participants’ speeches on whether they explicitly 
stated that they wanted to exclude the prospective group member (1 = 
inclusion, 2 = exclusion) as a behavioral measure of exclusion.  
 
                                                 
12 Similar to Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, we also included measures of differentiation and social 
identity threat (α = .86). An ANOVA on differentiation only yielded a significant Dimension X 
Direction interaction, F(1, 95) = 6.41, p = .01, ηp² = .06. Simple main effect analyses showed that 
participants perceived more differences between the prospective group member who lacked 
morality and the group (M = 6.72, SD = 1.43) than between the prospective group member who 
lacked competence and the group (M = 5.48, SD = 1.42), F(1, 48) = 9.48, p = .003, ηp² = .16, 
thereby replicating the results of Experiment 4.1.  
For social identity threat, only a main effect of direction emerged, F(1, 95) = 11.13, p = .001, ηp² 
= .10. Participants in the positive conditions reported more social identity threat than participants 
in the negative conditions. The Dimension X Direction interaction was not significant, F (1, 95) = 
0.20, p = .65, ηp² = .002. Considering that participants already derogated the prospective group 
member in terms of perceived trustworthiness and arrogance (an opportunity that participants in 
Experiments 4.1 and 4.2 were not given), they might have already reduced the threat posed by the 
prospective group member (see Eidelman & Biernat, 2003). Nevertheless, in line with the results 
of Experiments 4.1 and 4.2, social identity threat correlated positively with the tendency to exclude 
the prospective group member, r = .52, p < .001. 
13 To confirm that the tendency to exclude, to socialize, and to approach prospective group 
members can be considered three separate constructs, we conducted a principal component 
analysis, using varimax rotation, of the 18 items. The analysis yielded a 3-factor solution, and 
factor loadings explained 59.47% of the total variance. Eigenvalues were 6.22 for the first 
component (i.e., tendency to exclude), 2.78 for the second component (i.e., tendency to approach), 
and 1.70 for the third component (i.e., tendency to socialize), thereby confirming the distinction 
between the three response strategies towards prospective group members. 
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Cardiovascular reactivity. Electrocardiographic signals (EKG), impedance-
cardiographic signals (ICG), and blood pressure were continuously measured 
during the experiment using a Biopac MP150 system (Biopac Systems Inc., 
Goleta, CA). Electrocardiography was measured using an ECG100 module 
and a Lead I electrode configuration. For measuring ICG the NICO100c 
module was used. Blood pressure was measured using a Nexfin monitor 
(BMEYE, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Cardiovascular data was stored 
using Acqknowledge software (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA) and manually scored 
using MATLAB software (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA) following 
standard guidelines. For an in depth description of the procedure, see also 




The data of ten participants were removed from all analyses due to expressed 
suspicion about the cover story, resulting in 99 participants with usable self-
reported data. Due to signal loss, we were left with usable cardiovascular data 
of 95 participants. Unless reported otherwise, all data were analyzed by means 
of Analyses of Variance with dimension and direction as independent 
variables.  
 
Checks. To assess the effectiveness of our manipulations, we conducted 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs with the perceived morality and competence of 
the prospective group member as within-subject variable and dimension and 
direction as between-subject variables. The 3-way interaction was significant, 
F(1, 95) = 158.47, p < .001, ηp² = .62. Simple RM-ANOVAs revealed that, in 
the immoral condition, participants perceived the prospective group member 
to be less moral (M = 3.32, SD = 1.21) than competent (M = 4.73, SD = 1.06), 
F(1, 24) = 25.23, p < .001, ηp² = .51. In the moral condition, the prospective 
group member was perceived to be more moral (M = 5.49, SD = 1.14) than 
competent (M = 3.79, SD = 0.60), F(1, 24) = 39.86, p < .001, ηp² = .62. A 
similar pattern was found for the competence conditions. In the incompetent 
condition, the prospective group member was perceived to be less competent 
(M = 4.32, SD = 0.69) than moral (M = 5.52, SD = 0.74), F(1, 24) = 47.09, p 
< .001, ηp² = .66, while in the competent condition the prospective group 
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member was perceived to be more competent (M = 5.45, SD = 0.81) than 
moral (M = 3.43, SD = 0.93), F(1, 23) = 57.13, p < .001, ηp² = .71. We found 
no differences between experimental conditions on group identification and 
private collective self-esteem (all Fs < 1, ps > .46). 
 
Perception of the prospective group member. For perceived trustworthiness of the 
prospective group member only the Dimension X Direction interaction 
emerged, F(1, 95) = 40.39, p < .001, ηp² = .30. Simple main effect analyses 
showed that participants reported to least trust the prospective group member 
who lacked morality (p < .001; See Table 4.1). The Dimension X Direction 
interaction also emerged for perceived arrogance of the prospective group 
member, F(1, 95) = 10.35, p = .002, ηp² = .10. Simple main effect analyses 
revealed that the prospective group member who lacked morality is perceived 
to be more arrogant than the prospective group member who lacked 
competence (see Table 4.1). In addition, a marginally significant main effect of 
direction emerged for perceived arrogance, F(1, 95) = 3.01, p = .09, ηp² = .03. 
Participants in the positive conditions tended to perceive the prospective 
group member to be more arrogant (M = 3.21, SD = 1.17) than participants in 
the negative conditions (M = 2.86, SD = 0.91). Thus, in line with predictions 
and the results of Experiment 4.1, group members evaluated an individual 
lacking morality more negatively than they evaluated an individual lacking 
competence.  
 
Evaluation of own membership. The Dimension X Direction interaction emerged 
for evaluation of one’s own group membership, F(1, 95) = 4.37, p = .04, ηp² = 
.04. Analyses of the simple main effects revealed that participants reported to 
be the least concerned about their own position in the group when the 
prospective group member lacked morality (see Table 4.1).  
 
Responses to the prospective group member. The Dimension X Direction interaction 
was significant for the tendency to exclude the prospective group member, 
F(1, 95) = 4.99, p = .03, ηp² = .05; the main effects of dimension, F(1, 95) = 
3.97, p = .05, ηp² = .04, and direction, F(1, 95) = 7.15, p = .01, ηp² = .07, were 
also significant. Simple main effect analyses revealed that the tendency towards 
exclusion was greater for the prospective group member who lacked morality 
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than the prospective group member who lacked competence, F(1, 48) = 9.52, 
p = .003, ηp² = .16 (see Table 4.1 for the relevant means).  
For the tendency to socialize the prospective group member, only main 
effects of dimension and direction emerged. Overall, participants in the 
positive conditions reported a greater tendency to socialize the prospective 
group member (M = 3.23, SD = 0.81) than participants in the negative 
conditions (M = 2.80, SD = 0.99), F(1, 95) = 5.92, p = .02, ηp² = .10. 
Participants reported a greater tendency to socialize the prospective group 
member who was evaluated on his/her competence (M = 3.23, SD = 0.90) 
rather than morality (M = 2.80, SD = 0.91), F(1, 95) = 5.92, p = .02, ηp² = .06. 
The Dimension X Direction interaction was not significant, F(1, 95) = 0.23, p 
= .63, ηp² = .002.  
For approach tendencies towards the prospective group member, again 
main effects of dimension and direction emerged. Overall, participants in the 
negative conditions reported more approach tendencies towards the 
prospective group member (M = 4.52, SD = 1.06) than participants in the 
positive conditions (M = 3.88, SD = 0.95), F(1, 95) = 10.63, p = .002, ηp² = 
.10. Participants reported more approach tendencies towards the prospective 
group member who was evaluated on the competence dimension (M = 4.44, 
SD = 0.92) rather than on morality (M = 3.97, SD = 1.12), F(1, 95) = 5.56, p = 
.02, ηp² = .05. The Dimension X Direction interaction was again not 
significant, F(1, 95) = 0.53, p = .47, ηp² = .006. Thus, individuals who are 
evaluated in terms of competence tend to be socialized and approached 
compared to individuals who are evaluated in terms of morality. Importantly, 
and in keeping with predictions and the results of Experiment 4.1, individuals 
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Exclusion-behavior. Two participants did not provide a speech, resulting in 97 
participants with behavioral data. Exclusion-behavior differed as a function of 
condition, χ²(3, N = 97) = 11.26, p = .01. In the negative conditions, 20% of 
participants communicated to exclude the prospective group member who 
lacked morality, whereas 0% of participants stated to exclude the prospective 
group member who lacked competence. In the positive conditions, 37.5% of 
participants communicated to exclude the prospective group member who 
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excelled in morality, whereas 16.7% of participants stated to exclude the 
prospective group member who excelled in competence. Exclusion-behavior 
was significantly correlated with the tendency to exclude the prospective group 
member, r = .70, p < .001.  
 
Cardiovascular reactivity. We computed mean scores for HR, PEP, CO and TPR 
for the last minute of the baseline and the first minute of the speech task. We 
then computed reactivity scores (Kamarck et al., 1992) by subtracting the 
baseline scores from the speech task scores (see Table 4.2). For each reactivity 
score, we transformed outliers (i.e., raw scores more than 3 SDs from the 
mean) to the most extreme score within 3 SDs above or below the mean.  
 
Task engagement. Overall, HR increased, ts > 4, ps < .001, and PEP decreased, ts 
> -3, ps < .001, significantly from zero during the speech task in all the 
different conditions, confirming sufficient task engagement and goal relevance. 
There were no differences between conditions in both HR and PEP (all Fs < 
2, ps > .20). 
 
Challenge and Threat. We calculated a single Threat – Challenge Index (i.e., TCI) 
using standardized z-scores of CO and TPR in the following formula: ZTPR * 
-1 + ZCO * 1 (e.g., Blascovich, Seery, Mugridge, Norris, & Weisbuch, 2004; 
Scheepers, De Wit, Ellemers, & Sassenberg, 2012; Seery, Weisbuch, Hetenyi, 
& Blascovich, 2010). Greater values indicate a relative tendency towards 
challenge, whereas lower values are indicative of a relative tendency towards 
threat. An ANOVA on TCI revealed no reliable differences between 
conditions, Fs < 1, ps > .46.  
Additional analyses demonstrated that TCI correlated negatively with 
exclusion-behavior when the prospective group member lacked morality, r = -
.40, p < .01, and positively when the prospective group member excelled in 
morality, r = .50, p < .001. This implies that those who communicated to 
exclude the prospective group member who lacked morality experienced threat 
rather than challenge, whereas those who communicated to accept the highly 
moral prospective group experienced challenge rather than threat. TCI was not 
correlated with exclusion-behavior when the prospective group member 
excelled in competence, r = .04, ns. Because participants did not communicate 
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to exclude the prospective group member who lacked competence, no 
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In this experiment, we directly compared the impact of individuals who lack or 
excel in terms of morality and competence on group members’ responses. The 
most pronounced responses towards prospective group members appear when 
the prospective group member undermines the group’s standards of morality 
rather than competence. That is, a prospective group member who lacks 
morality is perceived to be more arrogant and less trustworthy than a 
prospective group member who lacks competence. In addition, group 
members are more inclined to exclude an individual who lacks morality than 
an individual who lacks competence. In fact, the behavioral measure of 
exclusion demonstrated that none of the group members communicated 
exclusion of a prospective group member due to a lack of competence.  
In line with the findings regarding exclusion responses, group members 
indicated to be less concerned about their own position in the group in the 
presence of a prospective group member who lacks morality rather than 
competence. Considering that group members are more inclined to exclude, 
and actually communicate to exclude individuals lacking in morality rather than 
competence, there is no immediate need to be concerned about one’s own 
position in the group; the chance that the individual who lacks morality will 
join the group and become a new group member is after all fairly small. It is 
much more likely, however, that the individual who lacks competence will join 
the group, raising more uncertainty for one’s own position.  
Surprisingly, we observed no differences in the tendency to exclude 
highly moral vs. competent prospective group members, as might be expected 
based on the results of Experiment 4.2. In fact, participants were more 
inclined to exclude a prospective group member who excels in morality rather 
than competence, and did this as often as they intended to exclude a 
prospective group member who lacks morality. This implies that prospective 
group members who either exceed or do not live up to the group’s standards 
generally run the risk of being excluded, because they arguably threaten the 
group’s positive image (e.g., Hornsey, 2008). The exception, however, are 
individuals who lack competence. Considering that incompetence is not 
perceived to be diagnostic of individual dispositions (Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987), nor reveals a deficiency of the group as outperformers potentially do, 
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individuals who lack competence do not threaten the positive social identity of 
the group and are therefore most likely to be accepted by the group.  
More inclusive responses towards prospective group members, in terms 
of socialization and approach tendencies, are more pronounced for 
prospective group members who are evaluated on the competence dimension 
than for those evaluated on their morality. This occurs regardless of whether 
they positively or negatively distinguished themselves from the group, which 
implies that the direction of the evaluation is, as predicted, particularly relevant 
when prospective group members are evaluated in terms of their morality. 
Because of the centrality of morality for the group’s positive social identity 
(e.g., Leach et al., 2007), group members apparently decide to include or 
exclude a prospective group member predominantly on whether s/he can 
contribute to the group’s moral standards or is a potential threat to the group’s 
morality. When prospective group members are evaluated in terms of their 
competence, the group is more likely to respond with more inclusive strategies, 
such as socialization and approach tendencies. Interestingly, group members 
are more inclined to socialize a prospective group member who exceeds the 
group’s standards, whereas they are more inclined to approach a prospective 
group member who does not live up to the group’s standards. Considering 
that a prospective group member who is superior to the other group members 
has the potential to benefit the group as a whole, socializing, or attempts 
towards conformity, seems generally the preferred response. However, 
individuals who exceed the group’s standards might also increase the salience 
of a group’s deficiency or threaten the group’s cohesion. From this 
perspective, a prospective group member who is inferior to the group poses 
no such threat to the image of the other group members, which makes 
approach tendencies more straightforward.  
As for the measures of cardiovascular reactivity, we found significant task 
engagement as well as goal relevance (as indicated by increased HR and 
decreased PEP) in all conditions. That is, prospective group members are 
motivationally engaging and relevant for the group, regardless of whether they 
are evaluated in terms of morality or competence. We did not find reliable 
differences between challenge and threat motivational states as a function of 
our manipulations. This is in line with previous research that was unable to 
differentiate between cardiovascular states of threat and challenge in response 
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to an ingroup deviant (Frings et al., 2012). As has been argued, the balance 
between situational demands and personal resources is relatively equal in 
dealing with a group member who exceeds or does not live up to the group’s 
standards. For example, the desire to protect the group’s positive social 
identity (i.e., a resource) might be tempered due to the uncertainty that a 
prospective group member raises (i.e., a demand). Although we were unable to 
distinguish between group members’ challenge and threat motivational states, 
in the correlational data we did observe associations between indicators of 
challenge and threat and exclusion behavior. Group members that tend to 
exclude a prospective group member who lacks morality experience threat 
rather than challenge, whereas those that tend to accept a prospective group 
member who excels in morality experience challenge rather than threat. These 
findings corroborate our reasoning that prospective group members lacking 
morality are more likely to be excluded from the group, because they pose a 
threat to the positive social identity. Conversely, group members are keen (e.g., 
challenged) to include a highly moral prospective group member, because s/he 
has the potential to contribute to the positive social identity of the group.  
 
General discussion 
In three experiments, we examined how group members respond to a 
prospective group member who is evaluated on the dimension of morality or 
competence. Our general hypothesis was that the morality of prospective 
group members leads to more pronounced responses from the group than the 
competence of prospective group members. Accordingly, our results 
consistently demonstrate that perceptions of a prospective group member who 
lacks morality are more negative than perceptions of a prospective group 
member who lacks competence. Furthermore, a prospective group member 
who lacks morality rather than competence elicits more social identity threat 
and is consequently more likely to be excluded from the group (Experiments 
4.1 and 4.3). This is in line with previous research demonstrating that 
information indicating a lack of morality is highly diagnostic of the individual’s 
dispositions (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), and explains why a 
prospective group member who lacks morality poses a serious threat to the 
group’s positive social identity.  
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Furthermore, our results demonstrate that prospective group members 
who can contribute to the group in terms of morality rather than competence 
are perceived more positively and are more likely to be accepted by and 
included in the group (Experiment 4.2). The results of Experiment 4.3, 
however, did not replicate these findings, and showed that group members 
tend to exclude highly moral and competent prospective group members as 
often as they tend to exclude a prospective group member who lacks morality. 
A possible explanation for these inconsistent findings is that whereas 
individuals who exceed the group’s standards have the potential to enhance the 
group’s positive social identity, they might also undermine the group’s 
cohesiveness and increase the salience of a group’s deficiency (e.g., Hornsey, 
2008; Schmitt et al., 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a consequence, 
individuals who are superior to other group members are often met with 
negative responses such as derogation and social exclusion (Monin et al., 2008; 
Parks & Stone, 2010). Future research might shed more light on factors 
determining when individuals who are superior to other group members 
enhance the group’s positive image versus when they threaten the group’s 
cohesiveness. 
In all three studies, we compared exclusion responses to socializing 
responses, a more inclusive strategy in dealing with individuals who exceed or 
undermine the group’s standards (e.g., Levine & Kerr, 2007; Pinto et al., 2010). 
In Experiment 4.3, we demonstrated that overall group members are more 
inclined to socialize a prospective group member who is evaluated on the 
dimension of competence rather than morality. This is not further moderated 
by the direction of the evaluation, and is in line with the lack of differences 
between the negative and positive morality and competence evaluations on 
socializing responses in Experiments 4.1 and 4.2. These findings support our 
general notion that the direction of the evaluation is particularly relevant for 
inclusion and exclusion responses to prospective group members who are 
evaluated in terms of morality. Considering the importance of morality for the 
group’s positive social identity (e.g., Leach et al., 2007), the stakes of accepting 
a prospective group member who is evaluated in terms of morality are higher. 
Consequently, including or excluding an individual who lacks or excels in 
morality has more impact on group members’ responses than the inclusion or 
 
113 
exclusion of an individual who underperforms or outperforms the group in 
terms of competence.  
In the current research we focused exclusively on responses towards 
prospective group members. Groups might, however, respond differently 
towards individuals with different statuses, such as full group members or 
marginal group members (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013; Moreland & Levine, 1982; 
Pinto et al., 2010). To illustrate, prospective group members do not yet 
contribute to the positive social identity of the group, but are assessed in terms 
of their potential contribution to the group’s image. Full group members, 
however, are perceived to be the most representative members of the group 
and hence their behavior has a strong impact on the group’s image (Levine & 
Moreland, 1994; Pinto et al., 2010). A prospective group member is thus likely 
to elicit different responses than a full group member. Whereas a full group 
member who lacks morality might elicit more social identity threat than a 
prospective group member who lacks morality, excluding a full group member 
might be more difficult than excluding a prospective group member. Future 
research could continue examining responses to group members of different 
statuses, as well as its motivational underpinnings (e.g., Mendes et al., 2007; 
Mendes, Major, McCoy, & Blascovich, 2008; Frings et al., 2012). 
The current research is further relevant for research on intragroup 
processes and in particular for research on—responses to—intragroup 
deviance and acceptance of marginal group members (e.g., Ellemers & Jetten, 
2013). In three experiments, we demonstrated that responses to prospective 
group members depend on both the dimension on which they are evaluated, as 
well as on whether the individual compares positively or negatively to the 
group. Whereas previous research examined responses to individuals who are 
superior (i.e., positive deviants) or inferior (i.e., negative deviants) compared to 
the group (e.g., Abrams et al., 2000), the current research is the first to 
demonstrate that these effects are qualified by the dimension on which 
individuals are evaluated. That is, a group responds differently to prospective 
group members who are evaluated on their morality vs. competence. These 
results are in line with the growing body of research that demonstrates that 
morality is in fact more important for the positive image of the group than 
competence (e.g., Leach et al., 2007). The present research is the first to 
systematically investigate how the morality of prospective group members 
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impact on intragroup processes, thereby bridging the literature on moral 
psychology and intragroup processes.  
 
Conclusion 
Groups can exclude prospective group members for various reasons, such as 
deviating attitudes, performances, and personality traits. In the current 
research, we demonstrate that the dimension on which a prospective group 
member is evaluated affects the group’s acceptance versus exclusion responses. 
The results of three experiments reveal that a prospective group member with 
deficient morality induces more social identity threat, and is consequently more 
likely to be excluded from the group than a prospective group member who is 
deficient in terms of competence. Conversely, the group is more likely to 
accept a prospective group member who can contribute to the group’s 
morality than an individual who can contribute to the group’s competence. 
Overall, morality evaluations of prospective group members elicit more 
pronounced responses from the group than evaluations in terms of 
competence. Thus, morality—more so than competence—appears to be an 
important dimension on which groups determine who is, and who is not, 






















Moral motivation refers to the motivational force that morality judgments 
exert on individuals. The aim of the current dissertation was to examine how 
moral motivation operates within groups. Groups evaluate the behavior of 
individual group members in the extent to which it contributes to goal 
attainment—that is, the extent in which individual group members act in line 
with the groups’ standards and as such validate the group’s positive social 
identity (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Levine & Moreland, 1994; 
Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 1998; Moreland & Levine, 1982). Intragroup 
evaluations thus provide a group with valuable insights in the legitimacy of the 
positive social identity, and help to elicit desirable behaviors from individual 
group members. Because individuals care deeply about how the group 
evaluates them, these evaluations affect their motivational responses in 
validating the group’s positive social identity (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, 
Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002). The research described in the current dissertation 
examined the impact of morality judgments on group members motivational 
responses, and compared these to the impact of competence judgments, the 
latter which up until recently were considered to be the primary driving force 
behind motivated behavior in groups (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Ellemers, 1993).  
Taking on a social identity approach, which explains what drives 
individuals as members of social groups (e.g., Hornsey, 2008; Postmes, 
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005), I investigated intragroup evaluations from three 
different group perspectives: In Chapter 2, I focused on evaluations of group 
members’ own prior behavior; in Chapter 3, I addressed evaluations of another 
group member’s behavior; and in Chapter 4, I examined evaluations of 
prospective group members. In the experiments described in these chapters, I 
distinguished between different types of motivational responses, namely 
affective, cognitive, psychophysiological, and behavioral responses. 
Considering the importance of morality for individuals and groups (e.g., 
Aquino & Reed, 2002, Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), the central 
hypothesis was that intragroup morality judgments generally impact more 
strongly on group members’ motivational responses than competence 





Overview of the main findings 
The central hypothesis tested in the current dissertation was that morality 
judgments have a more pronounced impact on group members’ motivational 
responses than competence judgments. In Chapter 2, I found that this 
prediction was supported for negative, but not for positive, morality 
judgments. In Experiments 2.1a and 2.2, group members recalled a situation in 
which their own prior behavior was evaluated by the group as either immoral 
or incompetent, after which affective and cognitive responses were assessed. 
The results revealed that group members reported more negative affect after 
their prior behavior was evaluated as immoral compared to incompetent, and 
this mediated their cognitive responses in terms of perceived coping abilities. 
That is, negative morality judgments elicited more negative affect which in turn 
induced lower perceived coping abilities, as compared to negative competence 
judgments. In Experiment 2.2, I replicated these effects, but this time group 
members were additionally given an opportunity to restore their image in the 
group. Results showed that after one’s prior behavior was evaluated as 
immoral, the opportunity to restore one’s image as a moral group member 
alleviated the negative affective responses and increased perceived coping 
abilities. Thus, although judgments of immorality evoke immediate negative 
affective and cognitive motivational responses in group members, these 
responses can be overcome when they get the chance to restore their image as 
a moral group member.   
To further investigate the impact of negative morality judgments of 
group members’ own prior behavior on their motivational responses, I 
examined their psychophysiological responses. In Experiment 3.1 of Chapter 
3, group members first recalled own prior behavior that was evaluated as either 
immoral or incompetent by the group, similar to the manipulations described 
in Chapter 2. Next, they worked on a group task with several other (fictitious) 
group members. The primary performance dimension was said to be either 
morality or competence. Group members could thus display moral or 
competent behavior in an attempt to restore their image as a moral or 
competent group member. Following the Biopsychosocial model (BPSM) of 
challenge and threat (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996), I assessed group members’ 
cardiovascular responses during the group task. Results revealed that, as 
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predicted, negative morality judgments induced a state of threat rather than 
challenge.  
In line with the notion that intragroup morality judgments have 
implications for group members’ social identity, I reasoned that negative 
morality judgments of another group member’s behavior would arouse 
motivational responses similar to negative morality judgments of own 
behavior. To test this idea, in Experiment 3.2 group members were exposed to 
another group member’s prior behavior that was evaluated as either immoral 
or incompetent. In a similar group task as employed in Experiment 3.1, I again 
assessed group members’ cardiovascular responses which revealed a similar 
pattern of cardiovascular reactivity as found in Experiment 3.1: Group 
members showed a relative threat rather than challenge response after being 
exposed to negative moral (vs. competence) judgments about another group 
member’s behavior.  
In Experiment 4.3 of Chapter 4, I followed up on this and employed yet 
another group perspective to intragroup evaluations: Group members’ 
psychophysiological responses to prospective group members. The results 
revealed that considering the credentials of prospective group members, who 
were judged in terms of morality or competence, is motivationally engaging 
and relevant for the group, yet this did not invoke a clear pattern of challenge 
or threat responses. I will consider a possible explanation for this observation 
in the next section. Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 provide support for the 
impact of intragroup evaluations on group members’ psychophysiological 
responses. Intragroup judgments of immorality and incompetence—regardless 
of whether they target the self, another group member, or a prospective group 
member—arouse cardiovascular responses that indicate task engagement and 
goal relevance. Overall, intragroup judgments are thus engaging and relevant 
for the group, and imply a psychophysiological readiness to act on the 
judgment. More specifically, negative morality judgments of group members’ 
own as well as another group member’s behavior are more pronounced than 
those of a prospective group member, and induce a psychophysiological 






Demand/ resource appraisals of becoming a moral group member 
Interpreting the results of Chapters 2 and 3 in terms of situational demands 
and available personal resources (i.e., perceived coping ability), there are 
apparent inconsistencies between group members’ cognitive and 
psychophysiological responses. For example, the results of Experiment 2.2 
show that group members’ perceived coping abilities increase after reminders 
of prior negative morality judgments in the prospect of a chance for 
restoration. This indicates that the prospect of an opportunity in which 
individuals can restore their image as a moral group member causes a shift in 
their perceived coping abilities. Whereas a reminder of one’s prior behavior 
judged as immoral elicits the perception that the demands outweigh the 
available resources, considering an upcoming opportunity to restore one’s 
image triggers the perception that there might be sufficient resources available 
to meet the situational demands. However, the results of Experiment 3.1 
demonstrate that providing group members with an actual opportunity to 
restore their moral image (again after recalling behavior that was previously 
evaluated as immoral), elicits a psychophysiological pattern indicative of threat 
rather than challenge. This suggests that the demands of the actual image 
restoration are perceived to outweigh the resources that group members had 
available for doing so. Thus, at the cognitive level an anticipated opportunity 
to restore one’s image as a moral group member led to a perceived balance in 
demand/resource appraisals, whereas actually engaging in such restoration 
activity led the situational demands to be perceived as to outweigh available 
resources, as deduced from cardiovascular markers indicative of threat rather 
than challenge.  
There are several possible explanations that might account for the 
apparent discrepancy between group members’ cognitive and 
psychophysiological responses in terms of demand/ resource appraisals. The 
first concerns the timing of measurement. Whereas the cognitive responses are 
measured in anticipation of the image restoration, the psychophysiological 
responses are measured during the actual image restoration itself. It may well be 
that in anticipation of the group task in which group members would get the 
opportunity to restore their image as a moral group member, they feel able and 
secure enough to do it, resulting in the perception that there are sufficient 
resources available to deal with the situational demands. However, when 
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actually being in the process of image restoration, the uncertainty regarding the 
ability to accomplish this goal and the anticipated consequences of failing the 
attempt, arguably become increasingly salient, resulting in heightened attention 
to the situational demands. In other words, when actually attempting to restore 
one’s image as a moral group member, reflecting on the consequences of 
failing in terms of the diagnosticity of immorality (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987), could plausibly have overruled the anticipated ability to do so.  
A second explanation for the discrepancy in group members’ cognitive 
and psychophysiological responses concerns the level of analysis. Cognitive 
demand/resource appraisals are measured at the conscious self-report level, 
whereas the psychophysiological demand/resource appraisals are measured at 
an implicit cardiovascular level. Whereas cognitive appraisals presume a 
deliberate assessment of situational demands in relation to available personal 
resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1991), the appraisal process can also be 
unconscious and based on affective cues (e.g., Blascovich & Mendes, 2000; 
Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). Hence, the 
(deliberate) assessment of demands and resources resulting in cognitive 
appraisals might be different from the (implicit) assessment resulting in 
psychophysiological motivational states of challenge and threat. Although 
earlier work on the BPSM and intrapersonal processes documented 
correlations between cognitive appraisals and cardiovascular responses, more 
recent work on intergroup interactions acknowledges the difficulty of 
correlating self-reports with implicit cardiovascular processes (e.g., Mendes, 
Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 
1993). Self-reports are susceptible to self-presentational motives and demand 
characteristics, which are particularly relevant in situations of image restoration 
where individuals’ dispositions and abilities are questioned. Individuals’ 
deliberate cognitive appraisals of the demands and resources are thus likely to 
be affected by such self-presentational motives, and might plausibly account 
for the discrepancy with their implicit psychophysiological responses.  
A third possible reason for the seeming discrepancy between group 
members’ cognitive and psychophysiological responses in terms of 
demand/resource appraisals concerns a theoretical explanation of the 
psychological meaning of the goal of image restoration. According to 
Blascovich (2008b), when trying to achieve a superordinate goal (i.e., restore 
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one’s image as a moral group member), individuals might need to approach 
several subordinate goals (i.e., show moral behavior in a group task). As long 
as the superordinate goal is desirable, individuals will approach undesirable, or 
threatening, subordinate goals. Although in the current research I did not 
control for the hierarchical order (i.e., superordinate vs. subordinate) of group 
members’ goals during the tasks, is it plausible that the nature of the tasks 
following the intragroup evaluations induced respectively a superordinate or 
subordinate goal in group members. For instance, considering the importance 
of morality for individuals’ identity (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Leach et al., 
2007), the superordinate goal of becoming a moral group member (i.e., 
anticipating image restoration; Experiment 2.2) could increase its desirability, 
and consequently be less demanding (e.g., less uncertainty that this is what one 
needs to do). However, the increased desirability of becoming a moral group 
member could have made the subordinate goal of showing moral behavior 
(i.e., actual image restoration; Experiment 3.1) more demanding, and therefore 
more threatening (e.g., more required effort to accomplish the task). The 
anticipation of reaching the higher order goal of being a moral group member 
might therefore be perceived as less demanding than actually behaving morally 
in a group task.  
The lack of a clear distinction between the motivational states of threat 
and challenge in individuals’ responses to prospective group members 
(Experiment 4.3, Chapter 4) could also be interpreted in terms of a 
demand/resource balance. That is, the balance between demands and 
resources appeared to be relatively similar in dealing with a prospective group 
member who is different from the group, regardless of whether this individual 
lacked or excelled in morality or competence. The high uncertainty of the 
situation itself—insufficient information about the prospective group member 
as well as the group task ahead—increased the demands of the situation to the 
extent that they outweighed group members’ resources to protect the group’s 
positive social identity, irrespective of the evaluative domain. If this is the case, 
then conditions that alter group members’ demand/resource appraisals should 
result in a clear distinguishable challenge or threat pattern. Indeed, it has been 
shown that increasing group members’ knowledge about the situation (i.e., a 
personal resource) can result in subsequent challenge when interacting with an 
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ingroup deviant (i.e., a situational demand; Frings, Hurst, Cleveland, 
Blascovich, & Abrams, 2012).  
Overall, the demands of situations in which group members need to 
protect their positive social identity, in relation to the personal resources they 
have available to cope with these situational demands, seem to underlie a range 
of group members’ motivational responses. To illustrate, morality judgments 
of group members’ own prior behavior, an ingroup member’s behavior, and a 
prospective group member increase the uncertainty of the situation, and affect 
group members’ assessment of their abilities in coping with the judgments; 
these result in different cognitive and psychophysiological responses.  
 
Behavioral responses towards prospective group members 
In examining group members’ behavioral responses to intragroup morality 
judgments, the experiments reported in Chapter 4 employed another 
perspective to intragroup evaluations. In Experiment 4.1 and 4.3, group 
members were confronted with a prospective group member who, compared 
to the group, lacked morality or competence. That is, the prospective group 
member was said to attach less value to morality or competence, and 
consequently be less likely to display moral or competent behavior. Because 
group members anticipated a group task in which morality or competence was 
the primary performance domain, they were given the opportunity to discuss 
with the other (fictitious) group members whether or not they wanted the 
prospective group member to join their group for the group task. By means of 
a questionnaire they supposedly could structure their thoughts and form an 
opinion about the prospective group member. Via chat simulation 
(Experiment 4.1) or video circuit (Experiment 4.3) they next allegedly sent 
messages to their group members explaining why they did or did not want the 
prospective group member to join the group for the group task. Results 
revealed that a prospective group member who lacked morality, compared to a 
prospective group member who lacked competence, was derogated more and 
aroused more social identity threat. Consequently, group members were more 
inclined to exclude a prospective group member who lacked morality than a 
prospective group member who lacked competence. Again, these results 
support the central hypothesis that negative judgments about morality impact 
more strongly on group members’ motivational responses than negative 
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competence judgments; this is also evident from behavioral responses towards 
a prospective group member.  
Interestingly though, the prospective group member did not yet 
contribute to the positive social identity of the group, and yet aroused social 
identity threat. Merely considering an individual with a moral deficiency as a 
prospective group member is a potential threat for the positive social identity, 
and therefore group members are motivated to distance themselves from such 
individuals. This distancing seems to occur at two levels: The psychological as 
well as the physical level. First, group members psychologically distance 
themselves from an individual who lacks morality by perceiving a greater 
difference between the individual and the group. Second, group members 
physically distance themselves from an individual who lacks morality by socially 
excluding that individual from upcoming group activities.  
 
Judgments of immorality versus morality 
As indicated before, the general hypothesis was that morality judgments would 
have a more pronounced impact on group members’ motivational responses 
than similar competence judgments. The results discussed so far support this 
notion, but specifically examined responses to negative morality judgments. In 
several experiments I also examined the impact of positive morality judgments. 
In Experiment 2.1b for example, group members reflected on their own prior 
behavior that was evaluated as being either moral or competent. Afterwards I 
assessed their affective responses. The results demonstrated that judgments of 
competence elicit more positive affect than judgments of morality. If morality 
judgments, regardless of their valence, would always elicit stronger 
motivational responses than competence judgments, then such judgments 
would have elicited also more positive affect. Although this is not what our 
results revealed, they are in line with research demonstrating the asymmetrical 
valence effects of morality and competence judgments. Whereas positive 
information about competence is regarded as more diagnostic of individual 
dispositions than positive information about morality (e.g., Martijn, Spears, 
Van der Pligt, & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & Spores, 1983; Skowronski & Carlston, 
1987), it is comprehensible that judgments of competence elicit stronger 
positive affective responses than judgments of morality.  
 
127 
In addition, in Experiment 4.2 group members were confronted with a 
prospective group member who ostensibly distinguished him-/herself 
positively from the other group members in the domain of morality or 
competence. That is, the prospective group member allegedly attached more 
value to morality or to competence, and was therefore more likely to display 
moral or competent behavior than the other group members. Similar to 
Experiment 4.1, group members were then given a questionnaire that 
supposedly helped them to structure their thoughts about the prospective 
group member, after which they had the opportunity to discuss whether or not 
to include the prospective group member in the group. Results revealed that 
group members experienced less social identity threat in the presence of a 
highly moral rather than a highly competent prospective group member, and 
were consequently more willing to include the highly moral prospective group 
member. These results are thus also in accordance with prior research 
demonstrating the impact of positive information about competence in terms 
of its perceived diagnosticity for the individuals’ dispositions (e.g., Skowronski 
& Carlston, 1987), because a highly competent individual is perceived as more 
threatening for the group than a highly moral individual.   
Taken together, the results of two experiments (Experiments 2.1b and 
4.2) directly rule out the possibility that morality judgments always impact 
more strongly or more negatively on group members’ motivational responses. 
In fact, it seems that the motivational force of morality judgments mainly 
pertains to immorality. Judgments of immorality are shown to elicit strong 
negative motivational responses in group members. More specifically, 
judgments of immorality elicit negative affect, lowered perceived coping 
abilities, a cardiovascular pattern indicative of threat rather than challenge, and 
a greater inclination towards social exclusion. Next, I will discuss the 
implications and limitations of the experiments reported in this dissertation, 
and provide directions for future research that emerge from the current 
research. 
 
Implications for moral psychology 
Research over the past decade has established the importance of morality for 
individuals’ personal identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Monin & Jordan, 2009) 
and social identity (Leach et al., 2007). Recent research has also begun to 
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explore the implications of moral motivation (e.g., Bauman & Skitka, 2009). 
Morality judgments have been linked to the regulation of behavior at the both 
the individual and the group level. For example, morality judgments affect 
individual goal striving (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Sachdeva, Iliev, & 
Medin, 2009), and group members’ motivation to adhere to the group’s norms 
(Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008; Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 
2011). Surprisingly, however, very little is known about how morality regulates 
the behavior of individuals within groups. The research reported in the current 
dissertation thus contributes to the growing body of literature that documents 
the implications of moral motivation. In doing so, I adopted a social identity 
approach and focused on intragroup processes, thereby aiming to fill the void 
between behavior regulation at the interpersonal and intergroup level. In this 
dissertation, I examined how morality judgments regulate the behavior of 
individuals within groups.  
As discussed above, the results of the experiments reported in this 
dissertation provide support for the central hypothesis that morality judgments 
impact on group members’ motivational responses, and that this is particularly 
true for negative morality judgments. These findings are in line with prior 
theorizing and research that report asymmetrical valence effects of morality 
and competence. That is, whereas positive information about competence is 
perceived to be more diagnostic of individual dispositions than positive 
information about morality; negative information about morality is perceived 
to be more diagnostic of individual dispositions, but also as more stable, and 
therefore to be of greater predictive value for future behavior than negative 
information about competence (Martijn et al., 1992; Reeder & Spores, 1983; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). Not surprisingly then, the research in this 
dissertation demonstrated that particularly judgments of group members’ 
immorality impact strongly on their motivational responses.    
These effects, however, emerged in the face of salient prior moral 
transgressions. That is, in the experiments reported here, group members 
recalled their own prior behavior that was evaluated by the group as immoral 
(Chapters 2 and 3), were exposed to the prior immoral behavior of an ingroup 
member (Chapter 3), or were confronted with a prospective group member 
who lacked morality (Chapter 4). In all these experiments, there were thus 
either direct recollections of moral transgressions present, or those were 
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indirectly implicated by the manipulations. The explicit or implicit salience of 
moral transgressions, considering the diagnosticity of negative information 
about morality, might (partially) account for the impact of judgments of 
immorality on group members’ motivational responses. In other words, group 
members’ pronounced negative motivational responses to judgments of 
immorality might be partially induced, or enhanced, because they coincided 
with reminders of moral transgressions. In order to fully understand the 
motivational power of morality, the impact of morality judgments should also 
be examined without salient prior moral transgressions. Indeed, there is recent 
research that suggests there are benefits to emphasizing the motivation to 
display moral behavior (e.g., morality judgments about future behavior) for 
group processes and intergroup relations (e.g., Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011; 
Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). This implies that morality judgments, 
when not coincided with moral transgressions, can also impact positively on 
the motivated responses of individuals in groups. Framing a goal as moral thus 
appears to have implications for behavior regulation in groups. Future research 
should continue to explore the motivational force of morality and morality 
judgments, also in the absence of prior moral transgressions. 
Related to this point, it would be interesting to gain insight in the 
extremity of moral vs. competent behaviors and transgressions. As the results 
of the experiments described in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation indicate, 
judgments of immorality (i.e., moral deficiency) impact more negatively on 
group members’ motivational responses than judgments of incompetence. Yet, 
with the present data I cannot rule out that this is because immoral behaviors 
are (perceived as) more extreme than incompetent behaviors. Indirect support 
against this possible alternative explanation comes from the experiments 
reported in Chapter 4, which show that prospective group members with a 
moral deficiency are condemned more than prospective group members with a 
competence deficiency. If immoral versus incompetent behaviors that are 
equal in their (perceived) extremity impact differently on group members’ 
motivational responses, for example because they are more likely to be 
attributed internally than externally (e.g., Skowronski & Carlston, 1987), this 
would provide further support for the notion that morality judgments operate 
as a unique motivational force. Future research can thus systematically vary or 
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control the extremity of moral and competence transgressions to further our 
understanding of the motivational power of morality. 
Consistent across all experiments reported in this dissertation, morality 
was operationalized at the trait level. As outlined before, individuals engage in 
trait inferences to evaluate and predict future behaviors. Moral traits, such as 
trustworthiness, honesty, and sincerity (Leach et al., 2007), give rise to 
behavioral expectations and therefore provide an appropriate level of analysis 
in examining the social implications of morality judgments in terms of group 
members’ motivational responses. However, considering the abstract nature of 
morality, varying from that which is “good” and “right” to virtues such as “no 
harm” (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt & Graham, 2007), it is plausible that 
merely activating the concept of morality automatically triggers a higher order 
goal than the more concrete notion of success as indicated by competence. 
Indeed, competence seems to be more specific to certain aspects of the self 
(e.g., excellence in academia is not related to excellence in sports), whereas 
morality seems to easily spill over to different aspects of the self (e.g., honesty 
on the job implies honesty in the game). Although the conceptualizations of 
morality and competence were kept constant within and between experiments, 
based on these data I cannot rule out the possibility that merely mentioning 
morality activated a higher order goal (i.e., beyond the trait level) for group 
members than mentioning competence. That is, morality judgments might 
automatically activate the superordinate goal of being a moral group member 
(e.g., being trustworthy), whereas competence judgments might merely activate 
the subordinate goal of being a competent group member (e.g., performing 
well on a specific task). Activation of such a superordinate goal, considering its 
importance for individuals’ identity, could have increased the situational 
demands, thereby eliciting more pronounced negative motivational responses 
(e.g., Blascovich, 2008b). This suggests that morality judgments are in general 
more demanding than competence judgments, because they represent a more 
desirable, superordinate goal for group members. Note, however, that 
depending on the specific situation (e.g., the nature of the task, such as 
anticipating image restoration vs. actual image restoration), the hierarchical 
order of the goal and consequently the demands of dealing with morality 
judgments can vary. In general, however, these will be higher than the 
demands of dealing with competence judgments. Future research might 
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systematically vary the hierarchical order of group members’ moral and 
competence identity goals (i.e., superordinate vs. subordinate), for example by 
stressing the importance of the specific task at hand, to gain further insight in 
the processes on which moral motivation operates. 
Additionally, it would be fruitful to gain insight in the content of group 
members’ moral behavior. In other words, it would be interesting to examine 
which behaviors group members judge to be immoral and consequently as 
threatening to the positive social identity of the group. In examining group 
members’ motivational responses, I compared morality judgments of behavior 
in terms of, e.g., trustworthiness, to the more obvious competence judgments 
of task performance and success. Although morality was defined as 
trustworthiness, honesty, and sincerity, and group members were instructed to 
recall behavior that was judged in these terms, the specific nature of (im)moral 
behaviors remains unclear. In the research described in this dissertation, the 
focus was on the social implications of morality judgments in terms of group 
members’ motivational responses, not on the content of morality judgments 
per se. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to gain insight in what exactly 
group members perceive to be (im)moral acts. A content analysis of group 
members’ descriptions of moral and competent behaviors could provide a 
valuable source of information for this purpose.  
 
Implications for group processes 
The research in the current dissertation also contributes to our understanding 
of intragroup processes and group dynamics. Whereas competence has long 
been considered as the primary domain on which groups and group members 
are evaluated, because it provides an indication of the group’s and individual’s 
status (e.g., Ellemers, 1993; Fiske et al., 2002), the current research 
demonstrates the importance of morality judgments for intragroup processes. 
Specifically, in multiple experiments I demonstrated the unique motivational 
force of morality judgments on a range of responses, relative to the impact of 
competence judgments. The results of these experiments thus indicate that it is 
important for research on intragroup processes to take the evaluative domain 
into account when judging group members. Whereas the focus of the current 
dissertation was on group members’ motivational responses, the domains of 
intragroup evaluations might prove important for other group processes and 
 
132 
phenomena, such as task performances, monetary outcomes, leadership, 
membership status, cooperation, and norm compliance, to name but a few. 
For example, in light of the current financial crisis, recent morality judgments 
of bankers seem to affect their status and monetary rewards, which arguably 
used to be primarily determined by judgments about their competence. Future 
research should continue to examine the impact of morality judgments on 
different group dynamics and relations. 
The centrality of group members’ demand/ resource appraisals for their 
motivational responses (e.g., cognitive and psychophysiological) is of particular 
importance for our understanding of behavior regulation within groups. 
Greater situational demands increase the salience of situational difficulties, in 
terms of, for example, level of uncertainty, required effort, and perceived 
danger, which most likely causes a vigilant approach to goal striving. 
Consequently, this might render group members particularly sensitive to 
failures and avoid taking risks (e.g., Higgins, 1998), which might result in less 
adaptive behavioral changes and induce stress (Blascovich, 2008a; Folkman, 
Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986). Considering that intragroup evaluations 
aim to protect the positive social identity and help to elicit desirable behaviors 
from group members (Moreland & Levine, 1982), evaluations that increase the 
situational demands might be counter-effective because group members 
become primarily concerned with the fear of doing something wrong. This 
might manifest itself in, for example, helplessness, domain disengagement, and 
withdrawal. On the other hand, when group members perceive that they 
possess sufficient resources to meet the demands of the intragroup evaluation, 
for example when they have enough knowledge to solve the situation, they 
might be more willing to speak up or be creative in their attempts to validate 
the group’s positive social identity. This might in turn be beneficial for the 
group as a whole. Future research should continue examining how group 
members’ demand/ resource appraisals affect their motivational responses. 
In examining group members’ motivational responses, I argued that 
these were aimed at validating the positive social identity of the group. 
Intragroup evaluations give group members insight in the extent to which this 
goal is attained, and communicate whether their, as well as other group 
members’, behavior is in line with the group’s standards. The intragroup 
evaluations, as operationalized in the experiments reported in this dissertation, 
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implicitly created group norms about the group’s expected level of morality 
and competence in order to validate the positive social identity. The intragroup 
evaluations thus indicated discrepancies between the behavior of the majority 
of the group members (i.e., normative behavior) and one individual (e.g., the 
self as group member, another group member, a prospective group member). 
Yet, in none of the experiments were the group’s norms regarding morality or 
competence explicitly formulated or communicated. In this regard, the current 
research only indirectly assessed group members’ motivational responses to 
the group’s moral or competence norms.  
Despite this more implicit approach to group norms, it is important to 
note that the research reported in this dissertation showed consistent results. 
The results demonstrate the robust nature of the central notion that intragroup 
morality judgments impact on group members’ motivational responses, in 
particular because group members displayed these motivational responses in 
experimentally created groups. That is, the groups in which group members 
arguably strived to validate their positive social identity had no meaning 
outside the laboratory. This maximized experimental control over the 
intragroup evaluations, since it ruled out the possibility of confounds with 
personal history or prior encounters between group members, or 
transgressions other than the ones made salient by the manipulations. 
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to examine how actual violations of moral 
norms affect intragroup interactions and impact on group members with a 
shared history. For example, individuals might find it more difficult to exclude 
an immoral fellow group member with whom they share a long history than 
would be the case with a group member in an experimental group whom they 
never met, because of other identity protection concerns (see Hornsey, De 
Bruijn, Creed, Allen, Ariyanto, & Svensson, 2005; Van Leeuwen, Van den 
Bosch, Castano, & Hopman, 2010).  
In preexisting groups, group members also tend to vary in their 
membership status. That is, individual group members can for example be full 
prototypical members, marginal members, new members, or deviant members. 
In the current research, and partially due to the use of experimental groups, 
the status of group members was kept constant within experiments. In the 
experiments described in Chapter 2 and 3, individuals were all considered to be 
full and equal members of the group. In Chapter 4, I distinguished between 
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full members and prospective group members. Membership status, however, is 
important for group members because it indicates how much respect they 
receive from the group and consequently legitimizes the positive social identity 
of the group (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, adherence to the 
group’s norms is particularly important for full group members, because these 
are the most representative members of the group (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 
1994). Consequently, the impact of morality judgments on group members’ 
motivational responses might vary as a function of their membership status. 
Prospective group members, for example, might be more easily excluded than 
full members, and marginal members presumably arouse less 
psychophysiological engagement than full members, because they are less 
relevant for the positive social identity (for a discussion see also Ellemers & 
Jetten, 2013; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 
2010). An interesting direction for future research would thus be to examine 
how the morality judgments of group members who differ in their 




















Morality is of particular importance to people; they want to be considered 
moral and want to belong to moral groups. The research described in this 
dissertation adopted a social identity approach to morality—by building on the 
premise that a social identity can motivate individual group members—and 
examined the impact of morality judgments on group members’ motivational 
responses. Groups evaluate, or judge, the behavior of individual group 
members, which can help to elicit desired behaviors aimed at validating the 
group’s positive social identity. The experiments reported in this dissertation 
examined the utilization of morality judgments in establishing this, and 
compared those to competence judgments. Results systematically 
demonstrated the motivational force of morality within groups. This moral 
motivation, however, seems to be primarily driven by group members’ 
concerns for immorality. Judgments of immorality elicit a range of 
motivational responses that mobilize group members in their pursuit of being 
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Morality is of particular importance to people: People want to be considered 
moral and want to belong to moral groups. Consequently, morality judgments 
have the potential to motivate individuals to behave in ways that are 
considered to be ‘good’. In the current dissertation, I adopted a social identity 
approach by building on the premise that a social identity can motivate 
individuals as members of a social group. Specifically, I examined the impact 
of intragroup morality judgments on group members’ motivational responses, 
and compared those to competence judgments as an alternative domain of 
evaluation. 
In three empirical chapters, I investigated the impact of morality (vs. 
competence) judgments from different perspectives, namely judgments of 1) 
group member’s own prior behavior, 2) another group member’s behavior, as 
well as 3) the behavior of a prospective group member. In addition, I examined 
different types of motivational responses: Affective, cognitive, 
psychophysiological, and behavioral. The central hypothesis was that 
intragroup morality judgments generally impact more strongly on group 
members’ motivational responses than competence judgments.  
In Chapter 2, I examined the impact of the group’s morality and 
competence judgments about group members’ own prior behavior, and 
focussed specifically on their affective and cognitive responses. The results of 
three experiments demonstrated that group members experience more 
negative affect, which in turn lowered their perceived coping ability after their 
prior behavior was evaluated as immoral rather than incompetent. However, 
when additionally given the opportunity to restore their image as a moral 
group member, the negative affective response was alleviated and perceived 
coping abilities were increased. In addition, I was able to rule out that morality 
judgments generate more intense affective responses overall, because being 
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evaluated as competent by others in a group elicits more positive affect than 
being evaluated as moral.  
In Chapter 3, I examined how morality and competence judgments of 
group members’ own prior behavior, as well as of another group member’s 
prior behavior, impact on their psychophysiological responses. In two 
experiments, I demonstrated that negative judgments of morality (vs. 
competence) elicit a cardiovascular pattern indicative of threat rather than 
challenge in group members. This pattern occurred regardless of whether the 
judgment concerned own prior behavior or the prior behavior of another 
ingroup member. Intragroup judgments of immorality thus elicit a relative 
threat rather than challenge response in group members. 
In Chapter 4, I examined how morality and competence judgments of 
prospective group members impact on the behavioral responses towards these 
prospective members. The results of three experiments demonstrated that 
prospective group members who are judged to be immoral rather than 
incompetent are more likely to be excluded from the group, because they 
impose a threat to the social identity. Conversely, group members are keener 
to include a prospective group member who is judged to be moral rather than 
competent. The morality of prospective group members thus elicits more 
pronounced behavioral responses from group members than their 
competence. 
In sum, the research reported in this dissertation demonstrated that the 
motivational force of morality largely pertains to immorality. Judgments of 
immorality are shown to elicit a range of motivational responses in group 
members, such as negative affect, lowered perceived coping abilities, a 
cardiovascular pattern indicative of threat rather than challenge, and a greater 
inclination towards social exclusion. Morality judgments—generally more so 
than competence judgments—impact on group members’ striving to be a 
‘good’ group member. Taken together, the current dissertation advances our 
understanding of the many ways in which morality judgments impact on 












Moraliteit is van groot belang voor mensen: Ze willen moreel gevonden 
worden en willen bij morele groepen horen. Moraliteitsoordelen hebben 
derhalve het vermogen om mensen te motiveren om ‘goed’ gedrag te vertonen. 
In de huidige dissertatie neem ik een sociale identiteitsbenadering aan, door 
voort te bouwen op de veronderstelling dat een sociale identiteit individuen—
als leden van sociale groepen—kan motiveren Ik heb onderzocht hoe 
groepsoordelen over moraliteit (i.e., betrouwbaarheid, eerlijkheid, oprechtheid) 
de motivationele reacties van groepsleden beïnvloeden. Ik heb dit steeds 
vergeleken met oordelen over competentie (i.e., vaardigheden, succes) als een 
alternatief evaluatief domein.  
In drie empirische hoofdstukken staat beschreven hoe ik de invloed van 
moraliteits- (vs. competentie-)  oordelen heb onderzocht. Ik heb dit vanuit 
verschillende perspectieven bekeken, namelijk oordelen over 1) het eigen gedrag 
van groepsleden, 2) het gedrag van een ander groepslid, en 3) het gedrag van 
een potentieel groepslid. Daarbij heb ik verschillende soorten motivationele 
reacties onderzocht: Affectief, cognitief, psychofysiologisch, en gedragsmatig. 
De centrale voorspelling was dat groepsoordelen over moraliteit over het 
algemeen meer invloed hebben op de motivationele reacties van groepsleden 
dan oordelen over competentie.  
In Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik drie experimenten waarin ik heb gekeken 
naar groepsoordelen over het eigen gedrag in termen van moraliteit of 
competentie. Ik heb me daarbij specifiek gericht op de affectieve en cognitieve 
reacties op deze groepsoordelen. De resultaten toonden aan dat 
onderzoeksdeelnemers meer negatieve emoties ervoeren, met als gevolg 
daarvan dat ze zichzelf niet goed in staat achtten om hiermee om te gaan, 
wanneer hun gedrag door andere groepsleden was beoordeeld als immoreel. 
Dit was minder het geval wanneer hun gedrag werd beoordeeld als 
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incompetent. Wanneer deelnemers vervolgens echter de kans kregen om hun 
reputatie als moreel groepslid te herstellen werd de negatieve emotionele 
reactie verlicht en nam de mate waarin ze zichzelf in staat achtten om hiermee 
om te gaan toe. Op basis van de resultaten kon ik vervolgens ook uitsluiten dat 
morele oordelen altijd sterkere emotionele reacties oproepen. Deelnemers aan 
het onderzoek ervoeren namelijk meer positieve emoties wanneer hun gedrag 
beoordeeld werd als competent dan wanneer het werd beoordeeld als moreel.  
In Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik me gericht op de psychofysiologische reacties van 
groepsleden. Ik maakte een onderscheid tussen cardiovasculaire patronen die 
indicatief zijn voor negatieve bedreiging versus positieve uitdaging. Hierbij 
onderzocht ik niet alleen de invloed van moraliteits- en competentie-oordelen 
over het eigen gedrag, maar ook reacties op oordelen over het gedrag van een 
ander groepslid. De resultaten van twee experimenten toonden aan dat 
negatieve oordelen in termen van moraliteit (vs. competentie) een 
cardiovasculair patroon induceren dat indicatief is voor negatieve bedreiging 
(in plaats van positieve uitdaging). Dit zelfde patroon werd gevonden ongeacht 
of het moraliteitsoordeel betrekking had op het eigen gedrag of op het gedrag 
van een ander groepslid. Groepsoordelen in termen van immoraliteit 
ontlokken dus een relatieve bedreigsreactie in groepsleden, in plaats van hen 
positief uit te dagen.  
In hoofdstuk 4 richt ik me op de bereidheid een potentieel nieuw 
groepslid in de groep op te nemen. Ik beschrijf drie experimenten waarin ik 
heb onderzocht hoe de moraliteits- en competentie-oordelen over een 
potentieel groepslid de gedragsmatige reacties van andere groepsleden 
beïnvloeden. De resultaten toonden aan dat groepsleden geneigd zijn om een 
potentieel groepslid dat is beoordeeld als immoreel buiten te sluiten, omdat 
deze een bedreiging vormt voor de positieve sociale identiteit. De neiging om 
een potentieel groepslid buiten te sluiten is minder groot als deze is beoordeeld 
als incompetent. Groepsleden zijn daarentegen meer geneigd om een 
potentieel groepslid in de groep op te nemen wanneer deze is beoordeeld als 
moreel in plaats van competent. De moraliteit van potentiële groepsleden leidt 
dus tot meer uitgesproken gedragsmatige reacties dan hun competentie.  
Alles bij elkaar toont het onderzoek dat beschreven is in deze dissertatie 
aan dat de motivationele kracht van moraliteit met name betrekking heeft op 
immoraliteit. Oordelen in termen van immoraliteit roepen een verscheidenheid 
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aan motivationele reacties op in groepsleden, waaronder negatieve emoties, een 
verlaagde inschatting van de eigen mogelijkheden om ermee om te gaan, een 
cardiovasculair patroon dat indicatief is voor negatieve bedreiging in plaats van 
positieve uitdaging, en een grotere geneigdheid tot sociale exclusie. 
Moraliteitsoordelen hebben over het algemeen dus een grotere invloed dan 
competentie-oordelen op het streven van groepsleden om een positieve sociale 
identiteit te verwerven door zelf een ‘goed’ groepslid te zijn of geassocieerd te 
worden met een groep waarin anderen ‘goed’ zijn. Hiermee geeft het 
onderzoek dat in deze dissertatie wordt beschreven inzicht in de verschillende 
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